

Despite two straight years of 25% returns, the market outpaced the [Top 50 hedge funds](#) by just 1 percentage point annually over the trailing five years through 2024. During that time, the Top 50 generated far superior risk-adjusted returns, experiencing half the market’s volatility and delivering nearly twice its Sharpe ratio. And through the first quarter of 2025, this group outpaced the market by 4.3%.

Macro, hedged equity, and event driven funds delivered the strongest returns. They were followed by seven emerging market funds with annualized returns averaging 13.5%. More than 80% of funds that made last year’s short list again qualified for the 2025 survey, and the group’s average age is more than 16 years—testaments to the group’s consistency and longevity.

by Eric Uhlfelder
30 June 2025

HEDGE FUND INVESTING DURING A TIME OF CONTEMPT

Three sharp selloffs since the start of 2020 tell investors how volatile the S&P 500 can be, especially now that the world’s largest economy has become a key source of geopolitical, macro, and market uncertainty. These risks spring from the breakdown in the norms and standards of governance across all three branches of the federal government. They are starting to impact the way markets and economies function—here and abroad. Ken Griffin observes, in discussing trade and tariffs, “We’ve devolved into a nonsensical place.” The single most significant force behind this change is contempt for established capitalistic, democratic, and diplomatic systems.

“Reality cannot be ignored except at a price; and the longer this ignorance persists, the higher and the more terrible becomes the price that must be paid.”

- Aldous Huxley

As the market and bonds sold off in April in response to President Trump’s announced tariffs, I sat down with Justin Young to discuss economies, geopolitics, and markets. Justin was the well-regarded financial force behind the \$40 billion South Carolina Retirement System and is now director of investments at the multi-endowment MEMCO. Justin brings a sober look past the current noise in describing a larger continuum that’s been going on for a while. His initial thoughts saw a struggle between ideologies and reality. But after considering the matter for a while, he concluded what we’re experiencing is a great rebalancing of priorities—the pendulum swinging back to the right. (See the full interview on pp. 21-23.)



Things Change 19 Oct. 2024

That makes sense given populist pushback against declining opportunities at home and globalization, which many folks feel has created an ever-widening wealth divide. In the process, we’re seeing a revival of nationalism and desire to return to a time when life was less expensive and the future more hopeful.

As I considered what Justin was saying, I thought back to last year’s study, when I sensed growing [cognitive dissonance](#) produced by so many conflicting data points. Economist David Rosen-

berg said, “I have been in the business nearly 40 years and have never before witnessed so many crosscurrents occurring at the same time.”

I sense these counterpoints colliding with Justin’s great rebalancing theory—supercharged by rising contempt and disregard for process. The result is pushing us well off the normal arc of conservative return.

Big picture: We’re seeing growing contempt for the post-World War II order shown by a rising number of extreme Western political parties and specifically in

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Consolidated Top 50 Hedge Fund Performance By Strategy

No. of Funds	Strategy*	5-Year Ann. Returns thru 2024	5-Year Sharpe Ratio thru 2024
3	Macro	19.35	1.76
9	Equity	19.18	1.43
2	Event Driven	14.57	0.80
7	Emerging Markets	13.45	1.07
9	Multistrategy	13.29	2.18
5	Arbitrage **	11.68	1.17
12	Credit and Fixed Income	11.17	1.04
2	Municipal Credit	8.83	1.68
Top 50 Averages		13.63	1.46
BarclayHedge Fund Index		6.15	0.44
S&P 500 Total Return		14.52	0.66

* The one fund that is not included is an asset-based loan strategy
** This category combines statistical, volatility, closed-end fund, convertible, and merger strategies
Source: BarclayHedge and proprietary sources

About This Year's Survey

Global Investment Report’s 22nd annual hedge fund survey is a comprehensive independent review of the industry’s most consistently performing broad strategy funds.

The Financial Times, *Barron’s*, *The Wall Street Journal*, and SALT commissioned 17 previous editions.

This survey tracks various data points over the trailing five years and since inception. Data includes worst drawdown, standard deviation, Sharpe ratio, and market correlation, which together provide a nuanced understanding of performance and risk.

Combining extensive statistical study with commentary from leading industry participants explains the source of consistent long-term performance that only a handful of hedge funds have been able to deliver.

Putin's expansionism. Mass migration and inflation have further fueled electorate contempt towards incumbents.

In the U.S., we're seeing contempt toward traditional conservative values that desire less intrusive government, more free trade, and use of soft power diplomacy to spread our values and standing around the world. This shift away from convention is being fueled by growing populist contempt toward expertise, experience, and compromise.

The Supreme Court has been delivering verdicts contemptuous of precedent, even after its newest members told Senators during their confirmation hearings

that past High Court rulings made many matters settled law.

These verdicts have included pushing aside constraints on Executive power established after Watergate, curtailing abortion rights, and refusal to acknowledge the logical right of government agencies to apply their expertise in dealing with matters that were only broadly authorized by Congress.

All of this helped usher President Trump back to power and his pursuit of a unilaterally conceived agenda. In the process, the president is displaying contempt towards an independent-minded cabinet, towards robust discussion and decision-making processes, towards

Congress (which has disappeared), the Federal Reserve, the judiciary (including the Supreme Court), states' rights, opposition protest, and our allies.

All administrations have casual relationships with the truth. But current Executive leadership, from the Oval Office and cabinet heads to the presidential press secretary, has frequently veered off planet: claiming the U.S. is a victim of global trade, Canada is not a viable sovereign state, measles is not preventable, the president inherited a failing economy, Ukraine is the aggressor, Putin is a victim, and presidential prerogative to start war without any congressional or ally consultation.

Why does all this matter?

Despite the remarkable resilience of the U.S. economy to rebound from all sorts of shocks, many businesses are now finding it increasingly difficult to run operations efficiently when certain governing policies are shaped by fiat and alternative facts.

Citadel's Ken Griffin argues, "we've devolved into a nonsensical place," and this is dangerous, especially "with the entire Western world engulfed in a debt crisis."

This is introducing all sorts of unnecessary challenges and stresses.

Early examples: European and Canadian travel to the U.S. has fallen by 20%. In mid-April, Goldman Sachs predicted the potential cost of this shift, coupled with reduced U.S. export sales, might reach \$90 billion this year; and China is now buying more oil from Canada at the expense of American producers, potentially costing them \$20 billion in 2025. Chip-giant Nvidia is taking a \$5.5 billion hit because a sale approved by the Biden administration to China was abruptly cancelled by Trump.

Walmart was called out for announcing it would need to pass on rising costs related to tariffs, which earned it a dressing down from the president who demanded the retailer eat the additional costs. Large importers and manufacturers might be able to digest a portion of the tariffs, but mid-size and smaller

“The United States is more than just a nation. It’s a brand. It’s a universal brand, whether it’s our culture, our financial strength, our military strength . . . It’s like an aspiration for most the world. And we’re eroding that brand right now.”

- Ken Griffin, CEO Citadel

operations will not be able to, potentially threatening their business models.

Apple is facing a 25% tariff on its iPhones if the company continues to make them abroad.

Then there are the billions of dollars in authorized government contracts that have suddenly been pulled from various businesses and universities involving work that was started and, in many cases, completed.

The challenge posed by the country's staggering national debt has been made worse by the new federal budget. By significantly cutting revenue, it's driving debt levels ever higher, likely requiring higher medium- and long-term Treasury yields to finance that debt. The budget will have the same effects on local and state governments, which will be forced to shoulder services dropped by Washington. And in a cynically ironic twist, many populist voters who supported President Trump last November will suffer the most from services and

assistance they will lose.

Even more disconcerting, Ken Griffin fears the combination of the global debt crisis combined with suspect US policies are putting, "the credit worthiness of U.S. Treasuries at risk."

Well before stocks started to rebound in May, Justin Young believed market reaction would help tamp down the current chaos and help the U.S. economy and securities reset right side up.

But former *Wall Street Journal* conservative columnist Bret Stephens is not so sure. He thinks that without seismic reconsideration of administration policies, "This will not end well."

But end it will.

This begs two questions: how long will the volatility last and how much damage may be done in the process?

These are just two of the many issues this year's survey will explore in assessing impacts this great rebalancing is having on the economy, markets, and hedge fund investments.

DATA ANALYSIS

Key Trailing 5-Year Results


- S&P 500 TR outperformed the Top 50 by just 89 basis points.
- But the 50 collectively generated superior risk-adjusted returns vs. the S&P 500.
- 5-year Sharpe Ratio of the 50 was 1.46; the market's was 0.66.
- Average market correlation of the 50 was 0.32.
- Macro, hedged equity, and event driven managers outpaced the market.
- Seven emerging market managers made the survey, generating annualized returns of 13.5%.
- Average age of the Top 50 (16.4 years) jumped more than 1 year from the 2024 survey.
- 80% of last year's funds qualified for this year's survey.
- Average fund size jumped considerably from last year, from \$3.7 billion to \$4.5 billion.
- One quarter of the Top 50 funds were managing less than \$1 billion.

The Top 50 funds collectively generated 5-year annualized gains through 2024 of more than 13.6%. That was 89 bps less than the S&P 500. But it was more than double the return of the average hedge fund reported by BarclayHedge.

When looking at risk-adjusted returns (Sharpe ratio) over the same period, the 50 generated vastly superior numbers. The market's was 0.66, and the Top 50's was twice that coming in at 1.46 and nearly three times that of

the average hedge fund. Digging deeper reveals the source of these superior numbers. The market's standard deviation over the trailing five years averaged over 18%;

INVESTOR ALLOCATION TO EQUITIES AT AN ALL-TIME HIGH



Source: EPFR Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research. As of March 13, 2025.

SANDGLASS OPPORTUNITY FUND

Outpacing The Crowd

After making the Top 50 last year based on its 5-year trailing performance through 2023, Genna Lozovsky's Sandglass Opportunity fund then rallied nearly 40% in 2024. That was the strongest performance of all funds on this short list, which included the likes of Citadel, DE Shaw, Millennium, Point72, and AQR.

With 5-year trailing returns of 17% through 2024, this boosted the fund's ranking from No. 33 to No. 13.

But what made the fund's returns noteworthy was that they were generated in emerging markets.

Those following this survey know a leading story has been the increasing presence of EM managers in the Top 50, an achievement we highlighted in our EM [webinar](#) that featured Lozovsky.

The key drivers of Sandglass' 2024 returns included gains from fiscal reforms in Argentina, Ecuador, and Pakistan; sovereign restructurings in Ukraine, Ghana, and Sri Lanka; and event-driven corporate opportunities in Eastern Europe and across Latin America.

Though last year's gain was many times greater than the firm's annualized returns, the PM doesn't anticipate mean reversion for several reasons. One, Lozovsky actively rotates his event-driven book with trades that are realized within a year or less; two, rising volatility and higher dispersion is creating greater opportunities; and three, global growth prospects remain resilient, despite uncertainty surrounding US economic trade policies.

"The basic risks associated with the administration's approach to global trade," he explains, "is it's relying less on compromise and more on trial and error." This drives uncertainty.

As the government navigates through its changing policy, it appears to be promoting the dollar's decline. Lozovsky believes this will likely increase the value of local EM currencies, lower their debt costs, and likely promote investment opportunities.

Backstory

Born in Ukraine and raised in the United States, Lozovsky developed an early interest in emerging markets while studying under the late Nobel Laureate economics professor Robert Lucas at the University of Chicago in the early 1990s.



Genna Lozovsky PM

Lucas questioned why capital flows into emerging markets had been so muted, despite offering opportunities with much higher return potential. The red flags, of course, had been weak legal infrastructure, capital repatriation concerns, and unstable governments, which had kept many investors away.

But things were beginning to systematically change while Lozovsky was at university, with many emerging markets being reshaped by the fall of centrally planned economies in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and China. These emerging economies were in drastic need of foreign capital investment inflows. This piqued Lozovsky's

interest in figuring out how to navigate the risks that remained extant while exploiting the attractive upside potential.

For many years, he managed private equity, credit, and distressed investments for several global emerging market firms before launching Sandglass in 2013 with his business co-founder, Michelle Kelner.

The fund's investment approach: pursue a repeatable strategy built on engagement with multiple local decision-makers to uncover overlooked, under-researched EM sovereign and corporate opportunities.

Lozovsky targets deeply discounted hard-currency denominated issues that will likely benefit from near-term recovery events. And he hedges many systemic risks: interest rate, FX, commodities, and equity-risk premia.

Sandglass never uses leverage, minimizes concentration in similar risk assets, and focuses largely on liquid securities. The fund regularly harvests profits when near-term upside is realized, the investment thesis has changed, or when better opportunities avail themselves.

While Sandglass is largely a long-biased credit-focused fund, it adds opportunistic exposure in equity, macro, and alpha-short positions.

The fund's geographical investment reach extends from Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East to Eastern Europe and South Asia. Lozovsky deliberately avoids China because of its excessively competitive landscape, opacity, and regulatory irregularities.

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the Top 50's was 9.8%. The average hedge fund's volatility was 8.2%.

The market's worst drawdown over this time was nearly -24%, when the pandemic initially hit in 2020. But the Top 50's average worst drawdown was -11.6%. The average hedge fund held up slightly better.

The Top 50's correlation to the market was 0.32. BarclayHedge, meanwhile, reported the average hedge fund had a market correlation of 0.91.

Looking at the average historical performance of the Top 50, over an average of 16-plus years, tells the same story of superior risk-adjusted returns.

Past performance doesn't ensure anything. But when management teams and strategy execution don't change, long-term consistency can be a pretty good indicator of an effective and repeatable investment process. And when that process has delivered attractive gains regardless of what the market is doing, then maybe that's something worth looking for.

This was the conclusion of a white paper I wrote with Ben Crawford, head of research at BarclayHedge, entitled [Challenging Convention](#).

Size

Another key finding of this survey is that steady consistent performance comes in all fund sizes. It's not the exclusive realm of the industry's largest and best-known

HEDGE FUND STRATEGY PERFORMANCE THRU MAR 2025

Ranked by 2024 Returns

Strategy	1Q25 Net Returns	2024 Net Returns	3-Year Net Annualized Net Returns (%) thru 2024	5-Year Annualized Net Returns (%) thru 2024	10-Year Annualized Net Returns (%) thru 2024
Equity Long Bias	-2.09	14.94	4.36	9.13	6.79
Collateralized Debt Obligations	1.86	13.88	6.16	6.02	6.69
Distressed Securities	-2.58	12.23	2.29	7.82	4.82
Equity Market Neutral	1.41	12.13	6.86	5.41	3.31
Asset-Backed Securities	2.03	11.44	7.03	5.16	6.34
Fixed-Income Arbitrage	1.84	11.42	5.90	5.79	4.39
Emerging Markets	1.97	10.34	1.06	4.41	4.67
Convertible Arbitrage	2.42	9.52	4.21	6.97	5.07
Global Macro	2.83	9.20	6.84	7.87	4.88
Equity Long/Short	-0.21	9.15	5.16	7.05	5.09
Asset-Backed Loans	1.30	7.90	6.36	7.06	5.63
Event Driven	-2.45	7.40	3.16	6.50	5.29
Mortgage-Backed Securities	2.72	7.15	2.27	1.88	2.15
Multistrategy	0.36	6.54	2.26	4.15	3.22
Fixed-Income Diversified	1.51	6.01	1.51	1.85	2.14
Credit Long/Short	1.38	4.91	1.87	2.21	2.03
Credit Long-Only	0.84	4.52	-0.81	0.09	1.59
Merger Arbitrage	1.61	4.45	3.31	5.33	5.26
Commodity Trading Advisers	-0.43	3.45	3.35	4.10	2.01
Volatility Trading	-1.15	3.01	1.79	5.52	2.48

Top 50 Average	0.06	15.17	11.92	13.63	NA
Backstop BarclayHedge Index	-0.06	9.68	3.23	6.15	5.17
S&P 500 Total Return Index	-4.27	25.02	8.93	14.52	13.10
JPMorgan Global Gov't Bond Index	0.89	0.15	-3.16	-1.35	0.56

Source: Backstop BarclayHedge

managers.

Only 8 funds that made the survey were running more than \$5 billion: Citadel, D.E. Shaw, Point72, Millennium, GoldenTree, Verition, Hudson Bay, and Drawbridge.

This was the same number of Top 50 funds managing less than \$750 million, and 12 funds in all were running less than \$1 billion. Especially noteworthy was the average age of these 12: more than 11 years, suggesting that these

consistently performing funds prioritized performance over asset gathering.

Few of these smaller funds are familiar names. But they've been regularly represented in this survey. Interviews of these managers reveal their funds' smaller size enables them to target a greater range of investment opportunities than larger funds that need to focus on bigger investments to move their needles.

Large funds can certainly benefit from greater research capacity and construction of more attractive investment deals. But smaller managers have an edge in finding opportunities in undersized and under-researched companies.

Leaders

Of the top ten funds with the highest 5-year annualized returns through 2024, six were equity strategies. All were managing less

Sandglass Opportunity Fund continued from p. 5

Investment Examples

A country at war is not normally an investment opportunity. But the manager thought differently after Russia invaded his birthplace in late February 2022.

“Toward the end of 2022, when it had become evident Russia would not destroy Ukrainian sovereignty,” observed Lozovsky, “we capitalized on our knowledge of corporate issuers in essential industries, including telecom, infrastructure, and heavy industry. These companies had little debt, were determined to remain current on debt performance, and had adapted their businesses to wartime conditions.”

Their hard-currency bonds were trading at extremely distressed levels, some between 15 and 35 cents on the dollar, while still paying their 7-9% coupons.

After speaking with local company management and various international authorities involved in supporting Ukraine, Lozovsky’s team invested. And within a year, these bonds had appreciated by 2.5 to 3.5 times.

Soon after Sandglass closed this trade, the fund began studying Egyptian finances in 2023. It saw an overvalued currency, a deeply negative net foreign asset balance, and acute financing needs.

Then October 7th happened.

Egypt was seen as a bulwark against the risk of growing regional instability. The Gulf Corporation Council, IMF, US, and Europe aligned their strategies to stabilize Egypt’s economic position to prevent regional disorder.

Sandglass met with Egyptian officials in London and Cairo to gauge the government’s plans and with the IMF to understand its program goals.

In early February 2024, Lozovsky established a long position in medium- and long-term dollar sovereign Egyptian bonds. The largest position, maturing in 2047, was trading at 63 cents on the dollar, with an implied yield of around 14%.

One month later, Egypt’s partners announced economic support packages in conjunction with Cairo’s decision to sharply devalue the pound against the dollar. Sandglass’ bonds climbed to 81 and the manager sold, realizing a 29% profit within a month.

Performance

These kinds of investments have helped Sandglass more than quadruple the returns of the BarclayHedge Emerging Market Index over the past 5 years and to even top the S&P 500 over that period by 2.5 percentage points annually—with less volatility than the market.

A telling indicator of the firm’s accomplishments is that nearly

40% of fund assets belong to cautious endowments and foundations, according to co-founder Michelle Kelner. About the same amount is owned by wealth managers, OCIOs, and fund of funds.

This kind of institutional acceptance has helped the firm steadily grow with strategy and firm assets approaching \$500 million and \$650 million, respectively. And recognizing capital constraints essential to sustain performance, Kelner anticipates the fund to soft close by the end of the year.

Less than one-third of the time, the team’s investment themes don’t work out. One recent example: in late 2024, after a period of pessimism about Turkey, the manager believed the country was returning to monetary policy orthodoxy, which would bring rapid disinflation. Having previously profited from positive changes in undervalued Greek and Argentine banks, Lozovsky saw a similar opportunity evolving.

Turkish bank equities appeared cheap, and the manager believed disinflation would result in lower interest rates and rapid loan growth. At the end of 2024, the fund invested in two of Turkey’s premier lenders, Garanti Bank and AkBank.

But in March 2025, President Erdogan arrested his main political opponent, Istanbul’s mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu. This triggered a sharp sell-off of lira assets, and a \$50 billion drawdown in Turkey’s currency reserves.

This challenged the central bank’s strong lira policy and meant that rate cuts would be delayed.

Bank stocks tumbled and Sandglass lost 16%.

“Correctly assessing Turkish political and economic risk has been a frequent source of profit for us,” says Lozovsky, “but not this time. We immediately divested, and swapped into short-dated local lira bonds, which are working well to recover our losses.”

Outlook

Noting the adage that when the US snuffles, the rest of the world catches cold, Lozovsky is concerned about an ostensible disconnect: tariff uncertainties and excessive deficits amplifying US cyclical and structural risks while global asset prices remain robust.

He acknowledges the remarkable resilience of the US economy. But if the economy does weaken, he expects Fed Chairman Powell to cut rates.

Overall, Lozovsky remains constructive on emerging markets. He believes, “continued dispersion and volatility coupled with the likelihood of lower interest rates and a weaker dollar should fuel EM growth and the prospects of finding more attractive opportunities.”

than \$1.8 billion and four were running less than \$1.2 billion.

The hedged equity fund that grabbed the top spot for the second straight year is the oldest fund in the survey.

The roots of **New York-based Peconic Grenadier** date back to when Ronald Reagan was president, having been launched in July 1986 by Forstmann-Leff & Associates. It was then spun out as a stand-alone entity in 2004 and led by William Harnisch, who remains the fund’s CIO.

It has generated annualized returns of 27.1% since the beginning of 2020, outpacing the market by 12.6% annually. And since inception, the fund has turned in annualized gains of more than 11%.

The \$1.3 billion fund quietly goes about its business without much celebrity. It feels like an old-school hedged equity shop that relies on a small team to suss out the most compelling growth and value opportunities primarily in the US. It then transforms its research into a short list of high-conviction long trades, with risk managed through selective hedging.

This tends to produce a net long position around +35%, but that figure ranges between 0% and +50%.

Even the outbreak of the pandemic didn’t slow down performance. After declining just -12% when the market went into free fall during the early months of 2020, the fund ended the year up 44%.

In 2022, when funds and the market tanked, Peconic gained 19.6%.

The fund’s worst 5-year drawdown over the past 5 years, -20.6%, occurred between July and October of 2023, when industrials sold off and the market corrected by -5%. The fund still ended the year up 23.5%.


Peconic’s torrid performance accounts for a good deal of its volatility of 22%. But it still was able to generate a 5-year Sharpe ratio of 1.12. The fund’s correlation with the market over this time was just under 0.42.

Toronto-based Anson Investments is the only hedged equity fund that has made the Top 50 survey every year since the current methodology was established in 2019 for the edition published by *The Wall Street Journal*. With ranking determined by the highest trailing 5-year annualized returns, that means Anson has one of the leading performance records dating back to 2014. (See sidebar on The Rare 11 on pp. 25-26.)

Each year since 2019, the fund has seen its ranking increase. It became the second-ranked fund in this year’s survey with annualized returns of more than 24% since January 2020, a Sharpe ratio of 1.8, and a worse drawdown of less than -5.4%. (See Anson’s profile on pp. 28.)

Led by CIO Moez Kassam and CEO Amin Nathoo, the multi-manager fund makes a variety of idiosyncratic

DECLINING US EARNINGS GROWTH RATES



Note: Year-over-year change
By: Lewis Krauskopf • Source: LSEG IBES
S&P 500 earnings projections in 2025

“We have the impression that there’s a serious disconnect between what the current US administration sees as reality and what reality actually is. This reflects more than the president’s thinking about economics and markets. There appears to be no serious assessment about problems and solutions--a lack of robust methodology that’s driving his policies.”

- Cédric Dingens,
Head of Investment Solutions &
Institutional Clients, NS Partners

HISTORICAL RANKINGS					Fund Name	Launch Date	Strategy	Fund / Firm Assets (\$ Million)	2020 Net Returns (Hurdle: 4.5%)	2021 Net Returns (Hurdle: 4.5%)	2022 Net Returns (Hurdle: -5%)	2023 Net Returns (Hurdle: 5.75%)	2024 Net Returns (Hurdle: 6%)	1Q25 Net Returns	3-Year Annualized Net Returns (%) thru 2024	5-Year Annualized Net Returns (%) thru 2024	Annualized Net Returns (%) since inception thru 2024	Worst Draw Down (%) Last 5 Yrs thru 2024	Worst Draw Down (%) since Inception thru 2024	5-Year Annualized Standard Deviation thru 2024	Annualized Standard Deviation since Inception thru 2024	5-Year Sharpe Ratio thru 2024	Sharpe Ratio since Inception thru 2024	5-Year Fund Correlation versus S&P 500 TR thru 2024
'20	'21	'22	'23	'24																				
NA	NA	NA	1	1	Peconic Grenadier (New York)	Jul-86	Equity Long/Short	1,302 / 1,302	43.69	34.21	19.56	23.54	16.63	-20.13	19.88	27.14	11.37	-20.64	-47.64	21.98	19.05	1.12	0.46	0.42
26	10	5	5	2	Anson Investments Master (Toronto)	Jul-07	Equity Long/Short	1,212 / 1,915	44.51	45.50	7.58	18.22	10.01	0.74	11.85	24.09	15.12	-5.36	-18.68	11.88	10.44	1.80	1.23	0.16
19	13	3	3	3	Citadel Wellington (Miami)	Nov-90	Multistrategy	52,330 / 65,000	24.51	26.58	38.22	15.28	15.21	-0.85	22.44	23.66	19.46	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
NA	NA	NA	4	4	Cooper Creek Partners (New York) *	Nov-08	Equity Long/Short	1,057 / 1,057	21.16	22.68	42.68	10.00	14.03	-10.57	21.41	21.53	11.03	-7.30	-22.12	11.37	11.22	1.67	0.88	-0.02
23	19	9	7	5	Citadel Tactical Trading (Miami)	Jan-08	Quantitative Equity	1,840 / 65,000	20.24	21.55	26.58	14.92	22.48	1.28	21.23	21.10	20.41	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
NA	NA	NA	9	6	AQR Helix -- Alt. Trends Composite (Greenwich, CT) **	Jan-18	Quantitative Macro	2,454 / 132,500	20.75	6.91	49.12	14.03	17.92	2.98	26.09	20.95	15.56	-11.09	-15.41	12.29	12.47	1.50	1.06	-0.27
NA	NA	14	15	7	DE Shaw Oculus (New York) ***	Mar-00	Global Macro	13,100 / 65,000	25.02	15.19	20.30	7.73	36.34	-0.76	20.85	20.54	13.49	-9.70	-9.70	8.92	8.39	2.02	1.41	-0.09
NA	9	8	8	8	Voss Capital Value Master LP (Houston)	Oct-11	Equity Long/Short	337 / 889	23.84	39.30	1.11	19.20	19.98	-7.29	13.08	20.06	18.30	-21.20	-21.20	24.50	17.46	0.72	0.97	0.76
NA	NA	NA	2	9	Engine Capital LP (New York)	Jul-13	Equity Long-Bias	1,069 / 1,069	25.77	32.58	6.58	15.48	15.21	-1.47	12.34	18.78	14.98	-18.96	-19.28	14.30	13.23	1.14	1.01	0.73
NA	NA	NA	11	10	Beryl Capital Partners (Redondo Beach, CA)	Jan-17	Event Driven	730 / 730	20.40	35.77	1.42	15.32	23.62	-24.64	13.07	18.77	14.48	-26.00	-26.00	25.65	20.68	0.63	0.59	0.37
					BarclayHedge Hedge Fund Index	NA		NA / NA	11.14	10.22	-8.22	9.27	9.68	-0.06	3.23	6.15	7.73	-11.90	24.09	8.17	7.04	0.44	0.79	0.91
					S&P 500 Total Return Index	NA		NA / NA	18.40	28.72	-18.14	26.29	25.02	-4.27	8.93	14.52	12.07	-23.89	-50.95	18.06	15.19	0.66	0.53	1.00

† Ranked by trailing 5-year net annualized returns thru 2024.
* Cooper Creek annualized returns since inception are through January 2025. ** AQR firm assets were as of August 2024.

*** DE Shaw Oculus and Composite historical performance and risk metrics since inception are through February 2025.
NA = Performance data was not available or fund did not qualify for inclusion.

“We’re entering a uniquely dangerous period of world history on par with the 1930s and the early Cold War.”

- Eurasia Group

investments, mostly in the US and Canada, that range from traditional activist longs and opportunistic shorts to SPACs and structured financing in which Anson makes short-term investments into smaller-cap stocks that it can profitably sell after the deals close.

Ken Griffin’s flagship mul-

tistrategy fund Citadel Wellington took the No. 3 spot in the survey for the third straight year with trailing 5-year annualized returns of 23.7%. Powering this performance were three consecutive extraordinary years starting when COVID struck in 2020 and the fund generated gains

of 24.5%, This was followed by returns of 26.6% and 38.2%. Since the fund was launched in 1990, Citadel has delivered annualized returns of 19.5%, making it among the strongest long-term performing funds. Perennially, the Top 10 funds tend to experience the most turnover of any portion of the survey. I caution readers not

to chase after the highest returns. These higher numbers are often difficult to sustain and can be associated with larger risk taking than funds that generate more modest returns. But that wasn’t the case this year. All of the 2025 Top 10 ranked within the top 15 funds in last year’s survey. And all but one increased its rank-

ing. New York-based Engine Capital, an equity long-bias fund, saw its ranking decline from No. 2 to No. 9. But that wasn’t due to declining performance, which was up more than 15.2% in 2024. The lower ranking was due to elimination of its remarkable 2019 performance in calculating 5-years returns. That year, Engine soared nearly 52%.

STRATEGIES: A TOP-DOWN LOOK
BarclayHedge tracks 20 different strategies ranging from hedged equity and credit, event driven, to various types of arbitrage, asset-backed loans and municipal credit. “While data provides a broad sense of how individual strat-

HISTORICAL RANKINGS					Fund Name	Launch Date	Strategy	Fund / Firm Assets (\$ Million)	2020 Net Returns (Hurdle: 4.5%)	2021 Net Returns (Hurdle: 4.5%)	2022 Net Returns (Hurdle: -5%)	2023 Net Returns (Hurdle: 5.75%)	2024 Net Returns (Hurdle: 6%)	1Q25 Net Returns	3-Year Annualized Net Returns (%) thru 2024	5-Year Annualized Net Returns (%) thru 2024	Annualized Net Returns (%) since inception thru 2024	Worst Draw Down (%) Last 5 Yrs thru 2024	Worst Draw Down (%) since Inception thru 2024	5-Year Annualized Standard Deviation thru 2024	Annualized Standard Deviation since Inception thru 2024	5-Year Sharpe Ratio thru 2024	Sharpe Ratio since Inception thru 2024	5-Year Fund Correlation versus S&P 500 TR thru 2024
'20	'21	'22	'23	'24																				
NA	NA	NA	NA	11	FIM MENA Horizon (Dubai, UAE)	Jun-10	Emerging Markets MENA - Equity-Long Only	2,094 / 3,805	8.83	38.69	7.76	24.98	13.94	0.38	15.35	18.29	13.97	-26.23	-28.09	17.52	13.79	0.90	0.92	0.50
30	23	11	13	12	DE Shaw Composite (New York) ***	Mar-01	Multistrategy	26,800 / 65,000	19.14	18.35	23.99	9.78	18.08	3.24	17.14	17.78	12.59	NA	-17.38	3.61	5.36	4.22	2.03	0.10
NA	NA	NA	33	13	Sandglass Opportunity LP Class D (London)	Feb-13	Emerging Market Credit ex China	409 / 570	9.46	16.25	-2.20	25.98	39.81	1.16	19.87	16.99	11.25	-19.90	-19.98	14.09	10.85	1.03	0.90	0.56
NA	NA	NA	NA	14	MW Market Neutral TOPS A USD (London)	Nov-07	Equity Market Neutral	4,393 / 69,000	14.23	23.73	15.63	7.67	22.74	6.43	15.18	16.65	9.97	-3.50	-15.99	5.73	6.37	2.46	1.38	0.16
32	34	16	16	15	Citadel Global Fixed Income (Miami)	Aug-12	Macro/Fixed Income	3,500 / 65,000	17.53	12.97	33.15	10.97	9.89	3.35	17.53	16.59	11.86	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
NA	NA	NA	NA	16	Napier Park Eton (London) ****	Aug-10	Credit Long/Short	1,168 / 21,800	28.90	15.73	1.82	18.08	18.44	1.69	12.50	16.26	14.47	-23.74	-23.84	15.81	11.05	0.91	NA	0.44
NA	NA	NA	10	17	Greenlight Capital (New York)	May-96	Equity Long/Short Value	3,700 / 3,700	5.20	11.90	36.60	22.10	7.30	8.20	21.35	16.04	12.90	NA	-34.00	17.60	13.10	NA	0.90	0.21
NA	NA	NA	21	18	Context Partners LP (La Jolla, CA & Greenwich, CT)	Jan-11	Convertible Arbitrage/RV	2,349 / 2,349	34.66	15.33	0.20	10.99	21.05	5.11	10.42	15.89	11.47	-7.29	-7.29	7.39	5.39	1.81	1.88	0.31
NA	18	18	18	19	Enko Africa Debt B (London)	Oct-16	African Macro/Fixed-Income RV	754 / 850	25.24	9.42	1.03	16.37	27.28	8.71	14.39	15.45	15.36	-21.19	-21.19	13.67	10.77	0.97	1.23	0.27
36	28	19	19	20	Millennium USA LP (New York)	Jan-90	Multistrategy/Credit Rel. Value	22,797 / 59,634	25.28	13.43	12.47	10.03	15.05	-1.97	12.50	15.13	13.67	-0.64	-7.01	3.52	4.16	3.58	2.65	0.07
					BarclayHedge Hedge Fund Index	NA		NA / NA	11.14	10.22	-8.22	9.27	9.68	-0.06	3.23	6.15	7.73	-11.90	24.09	8.17	7.04	0.44	0.79	0.91
					S&P 500 Total Return Index	NA		NA / NA	18.40	28.72	-18.14	26.29	25.02	-4.27	8.93	14.52	12.07	-23.89	-50.95	18.06	15.19	0.66	0.53	1.00

*** DE Shaw Composite and Oculus historical performance and risk metrics since inception are through February 2025.
**** Napier Park Global Capital firm assets were as of June 2024.

NA = Performance data was not available or fund did not qualify for inclusion.

egies have been performing over time,” explains Ben Crawford, head of research at the alternative database, “they mask wide dispersion of fund performance within each strategy.” (See Strategy table on p. 6.)
Another shortcoming of most databases: many of the

largest and most exclusive hedge funds, including all the various strategies managed by Citadel, D.E. Shaw, and Point72, don’t report to them. In contrast, the Top 50 includes 6 funds from this group, helping to better identify the most consistent strategies.

Broad View
Over the past several years, we’ve seen a material contraction in the performance spread between top-performing and worst-performing strategies.
In 2022, when inflation and global interest rates took off, shocking markets and

investors, that performance breadth extended beyond 20 percentage points. On the top, Commodity Trading Advisors gained more than 7.1%, while emerging markets fell the most, down -13.9%.
In 2023, the spread shrunk a bit to 15.5 percentage points, with equity long-bias having

taken the pole position up 15% while CTAs saw a complete reversal of fortune, registering the weakest returns, down -0.4%.
And last year, the differential was under 12 percentage points. Equity long-bias again took the top spot, with average gains of 14.9%, and

volatility trading came in last, up 3%.
Collateralized debt obligations retained the second spot in 2024 with gains of 13.9%. But the big mover was distressed securities. That strategy rallied from 19th spot in 2023, when it was up just 2.1%, to 3rd place in 2024,

when it gained 12.2%.
Convertible arbitrage and global macro made considerable leaps. The former improved from 17th (4.7%) to 8th (9.5%); the latter from 15th (4.9%) to 9th (9.2%).
Losing the most ground in 2024 were strategies that are well represented in this year’s

Top 50 with 12 credit and fixed income funds having made the cut. They collectively gained 14.7% last year. But when looking across the industry, credit long-short fell from 7th place (7.3%) to 16th (4.9%) and fixed-income diversified sank from 6th (8.5%) to 15th (6%).

HISTORICAL RANKINGS					Fund Name	Launch Date	Strategy	Fund / Firm Assets (\$ Million)	2020 Net Returns (Hurdle: 4.5%)	2021 Net Returns (Hurdle: 4.5%)	2022 Net Returns (Hurdle: -5%)	2023 Net Returns (Hurdle: 5.75%)	2024 Net Returns (Hurdle: 6%)	1Q25 Net Returns	3-Year Annualized Net Returns (%) thru 2024	5-Year Annualized Net Returns (%) thru 2024	Annualized Net Returns (%) since inception thru 2024	Worst Draw Down (%) Last 5 Yrs thru 2024	Worst Draw Down (%) since Inception thru 2024	5-Year Annualized Standard Deviation thru 2024	Annualized Standard Deviation since Inception thru 2024	5-Year Sharpe Ratio thru 2024	Sharpe Ratio since Inception thru 2024	5-Year Fund Correlation versus S&P 500 TR thru 2024
'20	'21	'22	'23	'24																				
4	8	13	17	21	Millstreet Credit (Boston)	Jun-10	Credit Long/Short	3,938 / 3,938	21.38	20.42	4.84	14.23	12.54	1.07	10.46	14.52	12.04	-4.39	-33.26	4.91	7.76	2.44	1.39	0.47
NA	NA	NA	25	22	Point72 (Stamford, CT) ^	Feb-18	Multistrategy	NA / 35,200	17.55	9.19	10.29	10.53	18.60	0.74	13.07	13.16	11.40	NA	-23.28	NA	7.87	NA	1.27	NA
43	46	27	28	23	Blue Diamond Non-Directional (Pfaffikon, Switz.)	Oct-11	Statistical Arbitrage	2,479 / 2,479	11.81	16.36	5.98	19.69	11.85	-1.17	12.37	13.04	14.33	-4.95	-9.71	7.95	10.25	1.32	1.26	0.44
NA	NA	NA	24	24	Glazer Enhanced Offshore Ltd (New York)	Aug-10	Merger Arbitrage	1,710 / 1,926	37.67	10.87	3.52	6.69	8.22	2.74	6.12	12.77	9.07	-9.01	-9.01	10.39	6.41	1.09	1.20	0.42
NA	NA	NA	27	25	GoldenTree Master Select (New York) ^^	Jul-00	Fixed Income Relative Value	14,000 / 57,000	11.35	21.66	1.62	15.00	13.93	0.82	10.01	12.52	9.05	-15.31	-15.31	9.44	6.79	1.06	1.12	0.68
NA	NA	NA	23	26	Verition Multistrategy Composite (Stamford, CT) ^	Mar-08	Multistrategy	11,600 / 11,600	30.41	8.60	5.57	8.19	11.16	1.50	8.28	12.45	12.76	NA	-7.89	NA	5.48	NA	2.11	NA
NA	NA	NA	NA	27	BlueBay Emerging Market Credit Alpha (London)	Nov-11	Emerging Markets Credit Long/Short	540 / 484,709	11.05	5.34	7.06	18.16	21.14	3.23	15.29	12.38	9.11	-16.23	-16.23	11.94	8.90	0.82	0.87	0.59
11	25	26	34	28	Mudrick Distressed Opp. (New York)	Jul-09	Distressed Credit	2,000 / 4,000	11.16	7.94	0.65	11.43	32.01	-25.07	13.97	12.17	11.33	-19.50	-31.48	16.04	12.68	0.53	0.77	0.15
28	16	29	31	29	FengHe Asia Fund Ltd (Singapore)	Dec-12	Asian Emerging Markets	3,847 / 4,618	19.10	27.20	-4.82	9.20	10.34	4.52	4.68	11.68	12.98	-11.50	-11.50	10.53	10.54	0.87	1.06	0.61
NA	NA	NA	NA	30	BlueBay Event Driven Credit Ltd (London)	Dec-09	Credit Long/Short	550 / 484,709	10.09	15.96	15.15	10.20	6.13	3.85	10.43	11.45	9.32	-13.51	-13.51	8.67	7.30	1.19	1.22	0.34
					BarclayHedge Hedge Fund Index	NA		NA / NA	11.14	10.22	-8.22	9.27	9.68	-0.06	3.23	6.15	7.73	-11.90	24.09	8.17	7.04	0.44	0.79	0.91
					S&P 500 Total Return Index	NA		NA / NA	18.40	28.72	-18.14	26.29	25.02	-4.27	8.93	14.52	12.07	-23.89	-50.95	18.06	15.19	0.66	0.53	1.00

^ Point72 and Verition net annualized returns and Sharpe Ratio are thru February 2025. ^^ GoldenTree firm assets were as of March 2025.
NA = Performance data was not available or fund did not qualify for inclusion.

The one strategy that continues to surprise on the upside is emerging markets. As a group, EM funds have risen from the nadir of 2022 (-13.9%) to the 5th spot in 2023 (8.6%), easing slightly in 2024 to no. 7 despite improving returns that topped 10.3%.
Seven EM funds made the

Top 50 this year, helped by having registered the largest returns of all strategies in the survey of nearly 21% in 2024. Two of these EM funds are profiled in this year's survey: 13th-ranked Sandglass Opportunity (see profile p. 5) and 27th-ranked BlueBay Emerging Market Credit Alpha (see profile pp. 35-36).

Top 50 Leading Strategies
Across the Top 50, global macro, hedged equity, event driven, and emerging markets generated the strongest 5-year annualized returns, accounting for more than 40% of the funds in the survey.
Equity
Nine equity funds collectively

returned more than 19.2% annualized over the past five years. That was more than 12 and 10 percentage points greater than the returns of the average hedged equity and equity long-bias funds, respectively, according to BarclayHedge.
These 9 funds experienced high volatility of 13.4%. However, much of it was on the

upside, which generated an impressive Sharpe ratio of 1.43 and a low market correlation of 0.31.
The three top-performing funds are all smaller running less than \$1.3 billion. But the most curious feature of their performance over the past five years—which was arguably among the most volatile 5-year stretch since

the dot com crash—is that during that time, two of the three generated twice their historical rate of return. The third outpaced its historical annualized returns by 66%.
Peconic Grenadier (No. 1), managing \$1.3 billion, was the best of the lot, not just within the equity space but across the entire Top 50, having returned more than 27.1%

“In responding to a changing investment environment, we seek to be more responsive to conditions, rather than trying to be predictive.”
- Moez Kassam, CIO Anson Investments

HISTORICAL RANKINGS					Fund Name	Launch Date	Strategy	Fund / Firm Assets (\$ Million)	2020 Net Returns (Hurdle: 4.5%)	2021 Net Returns (Hurdle: 4.5%)	2022 Net Returns (Hurdle: -5%)	2023 Net Returns (Hurdle: 5.75%)	2024 Net Returns (Hurdle: 6%)	1Q25 Net Returns	3-Year Annualized Net Returns (%) thru 2024	5-Year Annualized Net Returns (%) thru 2024	Annualized Net Returns (%) since inception thru 2024	Worst Draw Down (%) Last 5 Yrs thru 2024	Worst Draw Down (%) since Inception thru 2024	5-Year Annualized Standard Deviation thru 2024	Annualized Standard Deviation since Inception thru 2024	5-Year Sharpe Ratio thru 2024	Sharpe Ratio since Inception thru 2024	5-Year Fund Correlation versus S&P 500 TR thru 2024
'20	'21	'22	'23	'24																				
NA	NA	NA	35	31	Palmer Square Opportunistic Credit LP Class A (Mission Woods, KS)	May-12	Opportunistic Credit	762 / 33,209	10.69	14.53	2.01	16.65	13.66	2.16	10.59	11.39	9.51	-23.36	-27.39	12.09	9.82	0.76	0.83	0.49
NA	NA	NA	32	32	Bay Point Capital Partners II LP (Atlanta)	Jul-18	Asset-Backed Loans	683 / 813	7.76	12.87	13.47	10.95	10.56	2.31	11.65	11.10	10.60	-0.87	-0.87	1.50	1.39	5.73	5.90	0.27
NA	NA	NA	NA	33	Caius Capital Class A (London)	Sep-16	Distressed Credit	1,241 / 1,378	8.82	18.51	9.48	7.63	9.23	3.96	8.79	10.67	11.64	-11.23	-11.23	11.48	10.04	0.71	0.95	0.31
NA	26	28	29	34	Whitehaven Credit Opportu-nites Master (New York)	Dec-09	Municipal Credit Opportunities	1,325 / 1,354	28.15	7.40	5.52	6.88	6.64	1.26	6.34	10.60	9.70	-1.45	-1.75	3.54	3.36	2.28	2.36	0.06
NA	NA	NA	45	35	Magnetar Constellation Ltd (Evanston, IL)	Mar-07	Diversified Fixed Income	1,906 / 19,000	18.61	13.53	-3.81	8.97	17.11	-3.38	7.07	10.57	10.93	-13.30	-13.30	10.36	8.28	0.78	1.16	0.36
NA	NA	NA	NA	36	Kite Lake Special Opportunities (London)	Jan-11	Event Driven	2,400 / 2,400	5.70	10.54	14.38	10.81	10.51	5.19	11.89	10.36	8.69	-9.49	-9.49	8.18	6.50	0.96	NA	0.52
NA	NA	NA	37	37	Waha Emerging Markets Credit SP (A) (Abu Dhabi, UAE)	Jan-12	Emerging Market Credit	1,039 / 2,800	14.90	7.20	1.80	9.50	18.40	2.80	9.70	10.20	10.40	-15.80	-15.80	5.40	4.40	1.44	2.00	0.23
43	46	27	36	38	Wolverine Flagship Fund Trading Ltd (Chicago)	Sep-01	Multistrategy	4,807 / 4,807	13.89	10.74	5.75	7.98	12.48	2.49	8.70	10.13	8.14	-10.84	-25.96	6.67	6.27	1.14	1.04	0.51
25	22	30	30	39	Boothbay Absolute Return Strategies (New York)	Jul-14	Multistrategy	1,750 / 2,200	25.24	11.38	1.27	6.71	7.03	0.52	4.97	10.04	9.43	-1.80	-2.41	4.3	3.91	1.75	1.97	0.26
NA	NA	20	41	40	Caption Partners II LP (Oklahoma City, OK)	Jun-16	Volatility Arbitrage	377 / NA	13.39	9.37	5.74	9.10	12.62	2.08	9.12	10.01	10.81	-7.15	-14.85	7.39	11.19	1.01	0.78	-0.32
					BarclayHedge Hedge Fund Index	NA		NA / NA	11.14	10.22	-8.22	9.27	9.68	-0.06	3.23	6.15	7.73	-11.90	24.09	8.17	7.04	0.44	0.79	0.91
					S&P 500 Total Return Index	NA		NA / NA	18.40	28.72	-18.14	26.29	25.02	-4.27	8.93	14.52	12.07	-23.89	-50.95	18.06	15.19	0.66	0.53	1.00

NA = Performance data was not available or fund did not qualify for inclusion.

“Continued dispersion and volatility coupled with the likelihood of lower interest rates and a weaker dollar should fuel EM growth and the prospects of finding more attractive opportunities.”

- Genna Lozovsky, CEO, Sandglass Opportunity

annually over the past 5 five years. The 38-year-old fund is the oldest in the survey. The second strongest equity performer was diversified hedged equity fund **Anson Investments** (No. 2). Launched more than 18 years ago, it was managing \$1.2 billion as of the end of 2024. It generated annualized gains of more than 24%, with a wicked-high

Sharpe ratio of 1.8. The \$1.1 billion **Cooper Creek Partners** (No. 4), which has been around since November 2008, has returned an annualized rate of more than 21.5% over the trailing five years. Its worst drawdown was just -7.3%. Volatility of 11.4% generated a Sharpe ratio of 1.67.

Global Macro
Global macro funds on average saw significant improvement over the past year, moving up the performance rankings from 15th to 9th with 5-year trailing annualized returns rising to 7.9%. But the number of macro funds in the Top 50 has been declining.
In 2022, 6 made the list,

then 5 in 2023. This year, the count was down to 3, but all ranked within the Top 15. The main reason for this decline was related to inconsistency, which knocked out funds that had regularly made the list. Clear trends that had formed in 2022, for example, including rising interest rates, falling equity and bond markets, and dynamic foreign

exchange rates gave way to more amorphously moving markets in 2023 and 2024. The three remaining funds are well-established industry names. Cliff Asness' 6th-ranked **AQR Helix**, the new fund on the block, which launched in 2018, delivered the top trailing 5-year annualized returns of 21%, supercharged

HISTORICAL RANKINGS					Fund Name	Launch Date	Strategy	Fund / Firm Assets (\$ Million)	2020 Net Returns (Hurdle: 4.5%)	2021 Net Returns (Hurdle: 4.5%)	2022 Net Returns (Hurdle: -5%)	2023 Net Returns (Hurdle: 5.75%)	2024 Net Returns (Hurdle: 6%)	1Q25 Net Returns	3-Year Annualized Net Returns (%) thru 2024	5-Year Annualized Net Returns (%) thru 2024	Annualized Net Returns (%) since inception thru 2024	Worst Draw Down (%) Last 5 Yrs thru 2024	Worst Draw Down (%) since Inception thru 2024	5-Year Annualized Standard Deviation thru 2024	Annualized Standard Deviation since Inception thru 2024	5-Year Sharpe Ratio thru 2024	Sharpe Ratio since Inception thru 2024	5-Year Fund Correlation versus S&P 500 TR thru 2024
'20	'21	'22	'23	'24																				
NA	32	41	42	41	CRC Bond Opportunity Trading (New York) ^^^	Oct-16	Credit Long/Short	965 / 7,500	10.61	10.28	1.52	5.93	20.95	5.30	9.16	9.67	10.07	-10.48	-10.48	NA	6.73	NA	NA	NA
45	36	35	38	42	Hudson Bay LP (New York)	Jan-06	Multistrategy	5,745 / 18,769	15.75	13.23	3.33	6.09	9.55	1.42	6.29	9.50	10.16	-1.21	-6.04	3.43	5.09	2.03	1.69	0.09
NA	NA	NA	44	43	ProMeritum Fund SPC Class A (London)	Jan-15	Emerging Markets Credit	377 / 600	7.19	4.57	4.53	15.77	15.78	-0.42	11.54	9.18	9.02	-8.94	-8.94	4.62	4.06	1.43	1.75	0.17
NA	NA	NA	NA	44	Redwood Offshore (New York)	Jul-00	Distressed Credit	2,200 / 9,400	10.89	13.72	-4.36	9.46	17.16	1.39	7.04	9.11	11.76	NA	-36.28	NA	10.26	NA	NA	NA
37	42	42	46	45	Mariner Atlantic Multistrategy Ltd (New York)	Nov-95	Fixed-Income Relative Value Multistrat.	2,918 / 8,700	9.94	7.15	4.14	7.95	6.76	1.60	6.36	8.29	7.65	-3.21	-29.00	3.21	4.23	1.51	NA	0.08
NA	NA	NA	NA	46	Wexford Spectrum LP (West Palm Beach, FL)	Apr-97	Global Multistrategy	612 / 2,000	5.47	21.45	-0.65	5.57	8.19	6.33	4.30	7.77	9.33	-27.36	-39.82	15.94	11.64	0.33	0.62	0.63
NA	39	45	48	47	Drawbridge Special Opportunities LP (New York)	Jul-02	Credit Long/Short	3,000 / 50,000	6.34	15.43	0.66	6.16	8.73	0.70	7.24	7.36	NA	-17.30	NA	9.10	NA	0.50	NA	0.49
NA	NA	NA	47	48	Summit TX Alpha Master (Forth Worth, TX) ^^^^	Jul-15	Equity Market Neutral	1,224 / 17,400	4.87	6.01	5.7	11.96	7.94	-2.65	8.50	7.27	6.16	-3.54	-4.87	4.32	4.02	1.10	1.06	-0.01
NA	NA	NA	49	49	Old Orchard Credit Master LP (New York)	Aug-14	Municipal Credit	1,254 / 1,430	10.36	6.32	2.93	8.94	6.85	0.66	6.21	7.06	7.72	-4.91	-4.91	4.21	3.64	1.08	1.65	0.47
NA	NA	NA	50	50	RiverNorth Institutional Partners LP (Chicago) >	Aug-07	Closed-End Fund Arbitrage	861 / 5,005	11.17	6.48	-1.22	8.70	8.87	1.48	5.34	6.71	11.57	-8.18	-8.18	6.88	7.46	0.61	1.33	0.80
Top 50 Averages						16.37 yrs		4,547 / 39,663	17.06	16.04	9.10	12.08	15.17	0.06	11.92	13.63	11.82	-11.63	-16.66	9.77	8.47	1.46	1.41	0.32
BarclayHedge Hedge Fund Index								NA / NA	11.14	10.22	-8.22	9.27	9.68	-0.06	3.23	6.15	7.73	-11.90	24.09	8.17	7.04	0.44	0.79	0.91
S&P 500 Total Return Index								NA / NA	18.40	28.72	-18.14	26.29	25.02	-4.27	8.93	14.52	12.07	-23.89	-50.95	18.06	15.19	0.66	0.53	1.00
JPMorgan Global Gov't Bond Index								NA / NA	5.55	-2.54	-13.01	4.52	0.15	0.89	-3.16	-1.35	5.94	-17.13	-17.13	5.03	5.86	-0.77	0.48	0.47

^^^ CRC Bond Opportunity Trading fund assets were as of October 2024.
^^^ Summit TX was formerly known as Crestline Summit Equity Alpha.

> RiverNorth data includes performance of RiverNorth Capital Partners LP , whose inception dates back to 12/31/2009.
NA = Performance data was not available or fund did not qualify for inclusion.

by a 49% gain in 2022. This contributed to higher volatility of 12.3% but also to an impressive Sharpe ratio of 1.5. But the most extraordinary statistic is that Helix was the survey's second-most uncor-

related fund over the last 5 years, coming in at -0.27. The oldest macro fund in the group, **D.E. Shaw Oculus**, got started back in 2000 and delivered trailing 5-year annualized returns of 20.5%.

Fueling the fund's move up the ranking from 15th in 2023 to 7th in 2024 was last year's gain of more than 36%. Despite Oculus' high-octane performance since the start of 2020, its volatility has

remained around its historical average, below 9%, which has produced a stunning Sharpe ratio over 2 while being uncorrelated to the S&P 500 (-0.09).
Citadel Global Fixed Income

has made the Top 50 ever since the current methodology was adopted for the 2019 survey. Over that time, the fund has steadily seen its ranking increase from 40 to 15, with 5-year trailing returns of 16.6%. Like AQR, the

fund got a big boost from its performance in 2022, when it gained more than 33%.
Event Driven
Just two event driven funds made the Top 50, but they

collectively averaged 5-year gains of 14.6%. That number of funds in this strategy could've been doubled if two other opportunity funds making this year's survey were classified as

event driven. But 13th-ranked Sandglass Opportunity is an emerging market credit shop, and 30th ranked BlueBay Event Driven Credit (profile on pp. 31-32) sees itself first as a credit fund. If they had been added in, the strate-

METHODOLOGY BEHIND THE SELECTION OF THE TOP 50 MOST CONSISTENTLY PERFORMING FUNDS

The value of any statistical study is rooted in its methodology and how well it distinguishes among lies, damned lies, and meaningful and actionable results.

The approach perennially deployed in this annual survey delivers that third outcome by objectively identifying active management that has realized consistent value.

The results also challenge a core belief that’s been driving markets for a long time: that passive investing delivers superior results.

Historical evidence supports the value of low-cost index investing. And for a 30-year investment period, it would likely serve most investors well. But it will be intermittently exposed to sharp sell-offs.

Because of market volatility, results over a 5- or 10-year period will be materially affected by timing. Risk is related not only to asset exposure but also to when that exposure commences.

A select number of seasoned hedge fund managers can mitigate that risk by achieving consistent returns across various market conditions.

Decades of research have shown there’s a corner within the multi-trillion hedge fund industry that delivers on that promise. Evidence of this claim is rooted in the way this survey determines consistency.

Data Verification

The initial search for these 50 funds starts each year in early February by reviewing various databases that report the previous full-year fund returns. The initial screen focuses on only broad strategy funds. The reason: to seek out managers who have consistently delivered gains with low to moderate volatility without tailwinds or headwinds associated with specific industry or country exposure.

Requiring funds to manage at least \$300 million helps ensure reliability of data. When funds reach that size, they are more likely to hire top-tier service providers. These include administrators, prime brokers, accountants, and lawyers, whose involvement may enhance reporting accuracy. These higher standards in turn may result in greater institutional investor and consultancy interest, which then may lead to further critical assessment.

Each fund that qualifies for the Top 50 is then contacted to confirm the accuracy of data collected.

When a fund feeds data directly into databases, accuracy isn’t guaranteed. Reported data may be from a founders’ class with low fees, numbers may have been revised since submission, or strategy clas-

sification may be wrong.

UCITS and ‘40 Act funds, for example, can slip into hedge fund databases. That risk is increasing as larger hedge fund managers increasingly spin off these more liquid, lower cost, and more publicly accessible alternative investment vehicles.

An example are London Stock Exchange-traded hedge funds. As closed-end funds, their trading price is determined by market demand as well as by the underlying performance of the fund.

Whether it’s a CEF or UCITS version, these results cannot be used as proxies for flagship hedge funds. When such funds are identified, they are then deleted from the screen.

A handful of managers refuse to verify their numbers. This does not mean their data is faulty, but it reinforces the need for prospective investors to always conduct their own due diligence.

Accordingly, the numbers cited in this report should be treated only as a starting point for identifying potential investments. Receiving published performance documents by the fund—not by a third party—is essential for verifying return histories.

Universe Expansion

Several years ago, I started to consider two types of funds I had previously excluded.

The first is diversified long-short commodity funds that include a global macro component—whether in determining investments or in making macro trades to hedge or enhance a strategy. Managers of these funds must contend with volatile markets along with financial, geopolitical, supply-chain and transport forces. They are far more complex and diversified investments than their names suggest.

The second group is exogenously levered funds. A fund that seeks to enhance performance of a flagship product by ratcheting up portfolio leverage beyond what’s embedded in specific investments feels like a cheat—a way to juice returns at the risk of greater volatility. But a deeper dive into this space reveals that managers who developed levered fund versions of their main funds have effectively contained risk while enhancing returns. (See the No. 24th-ranked Glazer Enhanced. The 43rd-ranked fund, ProMeritum, recently launched an enhanced version of this fund.)

Performance Hurdles

Among the survey’s most important filters is use of performance hurdles for each of the last five years. They appear at the top of each

yearly data column on pp. 9-18.

Minimum annual performance standards impose further discipline in fund selection. This helps identify managers who may likely take profits periodically and successfully redeploy them, rather than betting gains may beget greater gains—an approach that can enhance risk.

Hurdles are also an indirect way of detecting strategy shift by identifying performance that significantly deviates from past returns.

For the year ending December 2024, the hurdle was set at 6%—the highest it has ever been since I adopted this approach for the 2019 *Wall Street Journal* survey. For that report, which looked at performance through 2018, my editor and I felt that funds on any short list, regardless of how well they may have done during the trailing five years (the basis for the ranking), needed to have delivered at least 5% gains in 2018.

The reason?

We wanted an objective way to see which funds delivered alpha—or to paraphrase Warren Buffett, to reveal managers who had trunks on when the tide went out in the 4th quarter of 2018.

That year, the market had enjoyed decent returns until the year-end selloff turned full-year market results and the average hedge fund negative. Both ended the year down around -5%. That meant we were screening for funds that had outperformed the industry and the market by around 10%.

This simple requirement promotes a list of more consistently performing and less-volatile managers. And because the hurdle is always a mid-single-digits number, it’s strategy agnostic. It doesn’t raise the bar too high for non-equity strategies when the market is ripping.

But it’s also saying, if you’re paying substantial management and performance fees, minimum net returns should be at least a couple of hundred basis points above the risk-free rate regardless of what the market is doing.

Hurdles have excluded many venerable funds that had previously made the cut, including Renaissance, Tiger Global, Element Capital, and Alphadyne.

Though infrequent, hurdles can knock off the previous top-ranked funds. In last year’s report, there was a significant rotation at the top of the 2023 list, with five of the top seven funds having failed to make the 2024 cut.

There have been several instances when funds have made this list for many years and impressed to have earned profiles in this survey. But then they have a slightly off year. In some instances, that shift in fortune is a tell, a nod to more closely examine why performance has shifted that sometimes reveal management or execution issues.

The only time the hurdle rate was negative and below the risk-free rate was in 2022, when war and supply-chain shocks collided with rapid post-pandemic spending, sending inflation and interest rates soaring. That year, the market lost more than -18%, 15 of 20 hedge fund strategies reported by BarclayHedge lost money, the JP Morgan Global Government Bond Index dropped by more than -13%, and the average hedge fund ended down by more than -8%.

There were few safe corners in which to hide that year. But at the same time, the risk-free rate soared to its highest levels since before the financial crisis. This created a conundrum in determining a fair hurdle rate.

It was set at -5%.

Still, 44 of that year’s Top 50 funds made money. Only five lost money, and only three were down more than -2%. The 50’s average return in 2022 exceeded 9%, which outpaced the market by more than 27%.

Fund Rotation

This year sees only a minimal fund rotation off the list. The seven funds that have been dropped were spread across the 50. A common reason for underperformance appears to have been skepticism that the 2023 rally would continue in 2024—the same issue that plagued some managers that made the 2022 survey but struggled in 2023.

The biggest surprise: Previously 6th-ranked Waha MENA Equity had made the survey every year since 2019 averaging gains of nearly 17%. Last year, it was up 1.2%.

I was tracking the 26th-ranked equity fund Hawk Ridge for years, waiting for it to clear its sub-par 2018 performance to qualify in last year’s report. Its 5-year and since-inception annualized returns for 16 years were around 12%. In 2024, it gained just 4.7%.

Then there was the 12th-ranked activist fund Starboard Value which had generated annualized returns of 16.5% since its launch in 2002. It turned in gains of just 4.2% in 2024.

This doesn’t mean these funds have lost their appeal, just that they significantly underperformed their historical average and the market during a time that proved supportive for most investments.

Beyond the Chaos: Markets Will Help Right the Ship and Ensure the Return of Rationality, Says Justin Young



Asset Manager Justin Young

This well-regarded asset manager looks beyond the current headlines and believes that once volatility subsides the US will retain its unique place in the global economy and markets. But valuation and growth risks remain front and center. We spoke several times as the initial bout of uncertainty surrounding tariffs was playing out.

Thanks for being here Justin. How would you briefly describe what's going on?

I see this as a global rebalancing process which was reflected in elections across developed markets in 2024—from the UK to France, Japan to the US. We've reached a point where the previous policy mix which relied on globalization, debt, foreign energy, immigration, and inflation—became increasingly unworkable. What we're seeing now is a global reset—politically, economically, and across corporate strategy—and markets are in the process of digesting that. You

also have AI emerging as a huge disruptive force.

Many experts like yourself fear our ballooning government debt and want to see spending seriously cut to reduce our national debt. That's not happening with the current Republican budget despite all the cuts in services. How do you think this will play out, and how does the extension of tax cuts jive with this effort?

Basic mathematics tells us that cutting taxes without equivalent spending reductions worsens our fiscal trajectory. That is why I am more interested in the combination of taxes, tariffs, and spending cuts in aggregate. One option would be a tax

cut alongside spending cuts. The administration is working on that, and I think markets would welcome that.

This issue segues into tariffs. What are your thoughts on the current trade war?

First, I believe framing this as a tax plan is more accurate than calling it a trade war—with the exception of China, where we have been in a trade war. Treasury Secretary Bessent says the administration is aiming to raise \$300–600 billion for deficit reduction through targeted tariffs that vary by country. This would translate to around 10–20% tariffs on \$3 trillion of imports. I believe these levels will end up being lower for Canada and Mexico, around 10% for most countries, and substantially higher for China. Overall, I think this is a manageable level and a modest headwind to earnings if costs are shared by foreign producers, domestic businesses, and households. This is likely to slow growth by less than 1% of GDP. The other goal seems to be to move

supply chains away from China towards our allies.

Huge brands like Walmart may be able to swallow a portion of the tariffs. But I imagine mid-size and smaller operations will suffer, which might end up further concentrating market share. If most foreign producers refuse to shoulder this burden and domestic importers pass on most of these tariffs, what then might happen?

As I just mentioned, I don't think average tariffs of around 10% will cause widespread economic indigestion or have huge market impacts. Currency movements are often larger than that. The ratio of who bears what cost will move around a bit. But my expectation, as outlined above, suggests the impacts should be manageable. We saw this exact dynamic play out in Trump's first term where he applied tariffs.

China, however, is the exception, and for good reason. Beyond being just another trading partner, China has positioned itself as a strategic rival pursuing economic dominance in critical technologies and industries. Foreign companies operating inside its borders face real risks: regulatory unpredictability, technology transfer pressure, and persistent IP concerns. These are not political abstractions—they're core business issues that affect long-term competitiveness, profitability, and national security. Ultimately, we're moving supply chains toward more predictable and aligned partners. This is also part of the rebalancing we discussed earlier.

This transition comes with short-term costs, but it should build long-term resilience. Over time, as business move supply chains elsewhere in search of lower tariffs, I believe markets will reward

that shift as a structural improvement, not as a setback.

The president's approach to global trade issues has begun to delay some expansion plans by both domestic and foreign companies. How long might that pause be?

It's too early to tell definitively. Both CEO and household surveys show significant unease. What remains unclear is whether these sentiment shifts will result in persistent behavioral changes or prove temporary. If markets stabilize or continue to recover, that should reverse some of the hesitation we're seeing. Interestingly, amid this broader uncertainty, we're seeing targeted efforts to reshore critical manufacturing in semiconductors and pharmaceuticals, creating sector-specific opportunities.

How long do you imagine it will take before the issues related to tariffs and associated volatility are resolved?

I think we'll likely see clarity within a couple of months. I think the Trump administration front-loaded the most economically controversial elements of his policy agenda. I think the remaining issues, like tax or spending cuts, are likely to be viewed more favorably by markets, which tend to be indifferent to cuts related to social issues.

I would like to push back a bit more here. The last two major stock market shocks were due to poor financial regulatory oversight and the pandemic, the latter having been countered by a unique and robust vaccine response. Significant recent cuts have been made to both governmental functions and leadership with material shifts being made to policy. Are you concerned these changes may enhance risks to the economy and markets?

While we're monitoring these areas, my view is that markets tend to focus more on fundamental earnings drivers than regulatory adjustments. I don't think these changes are likely to have the same impact on earnings as policies like tariffs and taxes. The cuts you referenced are

certainly showing headcount reductions, but not a dismantling of the core agencies, so I would view the changes as less existential.

We're seeing significant decline in foreign tourism into the US, a material movement against buying American products, slowdown in foreign student applications to US schools, and a pause in foreign direct investments until there's greater clarity. Again, are you concerned that these might materially affect the economy and market?

I think these issues have also generally been overstated. So far, travel data and hotel occupancy show no impact. Foreign direct investment in the US is less than 1% of GDP annually, and at the same time, we're also seeing onshoring activity expand. I believe some of the hesitancy we're seeing—whether in tourism or university applications—reflects uncertainty, not a structural rejection of the US as a destination for talent or capital. Generally speaking, I do expect to see a modest hit to earnings from tariffs and a small increase in price levels, and I'm closely assessing the impact of this uncertainty on cross-broader investments.

Let's change gears for a moment and discuss your move from the \$40 billion South Carolina Retirement plan to a \$3 billion organization in Oklahoma. What was behind this move?

There were two big reasons. One, at South Carolina, the program I managed was focused exclusively on market-neutral hedge funds. After building a strategic asset allocation framework and reallocating 75% of the portfolio, then designing a robust reporting and risk process, I felt I had taken the program as far as I could and wanted a bigger challenge.

MEMCO offered the opportunity to work with a broader platform with multiple clients, three hedge fund portfolios configured around a directional book, a relative value exposure, a new portable alpha program as well as the ability to work with private market investments.

Let's discuss your decision to introduce portable alpha.

To maximize alpha exposure, we focused on managers running 100% alpha overlay strategies. These managers provide exposure to their hedge fund strategies alongside equity beta via swaps, allowing us to maintain market exposure while isolating active returns.

What are the benefits of MEMCO's non-profit status as an OCIO?

The first is that serving non-profit clients, like university endowments, means we think about taxes far less than most people and that opens up our investible universe quite a bit. The second is that we are focused on client portfolios and not our bottom line. Third, we have much lower expenses, greater transparency, and our clients can even join our board. Lastly, and most importantly, the work offers a much deeper sense of purpose: we're funding scholarships and retirement benefits.

Have you rotated strategy exposure in response to the spike in volatility?

No, other than adding a small amount of equity exposure during the recent lows. The changes we've been making over the past several years have inherently derisked our exposure, the biggest being to our directional hedge fund book, which had historically been mostly long-short equity. We're now more focused on increasing capital efficiency and reducing beta. We added shorter duration private credit strategies (picking up illiquidity premia), reinsurance after the dislocation in 2022, and higher vol macro and directional commodity exposure alongside our existing CTA exposure. While our average fund volatility is in the mid-teens, diversification has lowered overall volatility in that portfolio to the mid-single digits. The benefit showed up last year when we delivered near equity-like performance with very low beta and our new portable alpha book outperformed equities. We are also working on a new tail hedge program to supplement our existing roster.

Continued on next page

Continued from p. 22

To mitigate capital-loss risk during this current period of uncertainty, are you considering risk-free investments?

With the recent rise in yields to levels meaningfully above inflation, we added a modest amount of long-duration Treasury exposure for the first time in a very long time. However, Treasury returns alone won't get our clients to their return targets. We're finding better value in shorter duration spread assets, like receivables, though these aren't entirely risk-free either.

Where do you think inflation and short-term rates are heading?

Setting aside tariff effects and potential dollar weakness, I believe the major inflation wave is now behind us. Energy prices have fallen considerably, rent has flatlined, and wage pressures have subsided with more tepid growth. With the Fed Funds rate currently about 2% above inflation, there's room for cuts by the end of the year—especially if growth weakens from here and inflation continues to moderate. Tariffs will have a short-term impact, but most economists and the bond market have not projected this to last beyond 12 months.

How do you imagine the economy and market will respond to the rest of 2025?

GDP and employment growth have been slowing for more than six months, with early signs of stress appearing in low-income households. When combined with tariff-related uncertainty, growth could weaken further by year-end. From a market perspective, rising bond yields mean minimal premium for equity risk. With valuations still elevated and attractive real yields in fixed income, equities could face downward pressure. A 10% decline in both earnings and multiples could translate to a 20–30% market drop. The market could realistically end the year well below Memorial Day levels.

Could anything drive earnings or stock prices in the near-term?

Several factors could improve the outlook. Moderate tariff cuts, which I believe are likely, would help offset uncertainty. Tax cuts and deregulation would likely support corporate profitability. Though AI capex is massive, these investments could soon translate into productivity gains and earnings growth. Lastly, we are seeing a coordinated global interest rate easing cycle alongside big spending packages in China and Germany.

Looking further out, if interest expense becomes a serious problem as near-zero rate COVID-era bonds are refinanced with more expensive debt, the Fed might consider implementing yield-curve control. This means targeted quantitative easing for longer-term bonds. If that were to happen, we would likely see gold, equities, and other real assets rip, though probably at the expense of the dollar.

If trade and capital flows continue to shift outwardly, do you see the dollar's reserve currency status coming under threat in the coming years?

I don't see the dollar's reserve status being challenged. It is anchored by the depth of US capital markets, global trust in American institutions, and the lack of a credible alternative. With that said, dollar weakness would not surprise me at all. It's rich when measured by traditional metrics like Purchasing Power Parity or Real Effective Exchange Rate, and US investors are heavily overweight US equities. Lastly, European and Japanese yield curves are much steeper, which reduces inflows into our bond markets.

Let's conclude by identifying risks that concern you most right now.

Beyond what we've already discussed, economic fundamentals have been softening beneath the surface since last summer. Hiring momentum is slowing, housing markets have stalled, PMI surveys suggest we may be entering a period of decelerating growth, and if Sino-American trade tensions aren't eased soon, China could stop exporting parts

and materials critical to manufacturing.

Adding to this, the delayed impact of rate hikes remains underestimated. Most US debt—corporate bonds, Treasuries, and mortgage-backed securities—is longer duration rather than floating rate and was refinanced during COVID at historically low rates. This means effective borrowing costs will continue climbing even as the Fed cuts rates, maintaining pressure for years to come.

While a modest slowdown would not normally be cause for concern, equity markets face a precarious combination of elevated valuations, stretched earnings expectations, and elevated allocations. US markets are now more than 70% of global equity benchmarks. Retail and traditional long-only investors maintain near-peak historical allocations despite growing economic pessimism in survey data. This cognitive dissonance seems unsustainable longer term, especially with 5% bond yields now offering compelling alternatives that should attract capital over time.

Longer term, the fiscal deficit represents the most significant structural challenge, though meaningful reform will likely require bond market stress to force policymakers' hands. Until then, these converging headwinds create an increasingly fragile backdrop for risk assets.

Eric Uhlfelder, June 2025

Justin Young is Director of Investments at MEMCO. In 2023, *Institutional Investor* cited him as a Rising Star for Alpha Generation. Prior to joining MEMCO, he spent 11 years at the South Carolina Retirement System Investment Commission, where he concluded his tenure as director of portable alpha. *Institutional Investor* named that program as Public Plan of the year in 2022. He began his career as a research analyst on the global equities team at Bridgewater Associates.

gy's average 5-year returns wouldn't have changed.


The lesser known of the two event driven operations is the 10th-ranked Beryl Capital that resides in Redondo Beach, California. The small \$730 million fund generated 5-year annualized returns of 18.8% on the back of three years of 20+% returns.

But this fund comes with higher risk. Its volatility and worst drawdown were running around 26, which depressed its Sharpe ratio to 0.63. And it got tagged in the first quarter of 2025, off -24.6%, and hasn't seen any improvement through May.

London-based Kite Lake Special Opportunities, which is managing \$2.4 billion, runs a more stable book. The 36th-ranked fund, with 5-year returns of 10.4%, has a volatility of 8.2% and worst drawdown of just -9.5%, which has helped it to achieve a Sharpe ratio of 0.96. And during the rollercoaster first quarter of 2025, it gained over 5%.

Emerging Markets

In 2022, only three emerging market funds made the Top 50. When the number doubled in 2023, the strategy's average 5-year trailing returns declined from 13.4% to 9.5%. But last year, 6 emerging funds that made the survey delivered the strongest returns of any strategy in 2024, soaring an average of 18.8%. This boosted their trailing 5-year annualized returns—which now counts 7 funds—back up to 13.5%.



As of market close on June 27
Source: LSEG Data & Analytics • By The New York Times

“Russia is the world's leading rogue power, now by a large margin following the collapse of Iran's ability to project power. This year, Moscow will pursue more policies that undermine the US-led global order.”

- Eurasia Group

That's triple BarclayHedge's average returns of all EM funds it tracks.

Last year's emerging market rally, especially in credit, was due to several factors, including structural improvements in certain sovereign debt markets, specific corporate restructuring, and growing macro and geopolitical uncertainty that increased both volatility and opportunities.

A systemic driver of returns has also been the limited

amount of active fund assets investing in emerging market credit relative to the actual depth of the EM credit market.

Leading the EM group is 11th-ranked FIM MENA Horizon, with 5-year trailing returns of 18.3%. and 13th-ranked Sandglass Opportunity, which delivered annual returns of 17%.

But these are two very different funds.

FIM founder and CEO Hedi

Ben Mlouka manages a long-only equity fund that targets stocks in the Middle East and North African region. His unhedged approach focuses on one of the world's fastest growing regions that's also often a place of conflict, which could make the fund prone to volatility. The fund's five-year volatility was 17.5%, with a worst drawdown of -26.2%. This produced a Sharpe ratio of 0.90.

Sandglass Opportunity, co-founded and managed

THE RARE 11: THE MOST CONSISTENT FUNDS

In quarterly reports that follow the release of each year’s Top 50 survey, the performance of each fund is then tracked to test the mettle of the selection process or to see if it’s more of a Sports Illustrated Cover Curse.

For those who aren’t familiar with the phrase, this is when an athlete or team gets featured in this venerable publication, only then to stumble. This occasionally happens in this survey.

But this sidebar takes a deeper dive into consistency by identifying the nearly dozen funds out of the hundreds that have made this short list since I established the current methodology for *The Wall Street Journal* edition in 2019. That survey identified the managers that had outperformed the market by at least 9.5% in 2018 and had the strongest 5-year trailing returns.

No surprise that this ultra short list includes the likes of Citadel Wellington, D.E. Shaw Composite, and Millennium. Perhaps more unexpected is the inclusion of far smaller and less familiar names. This analysis reveals funds with the most consistent returns, dating back more than a decade, and some of the characteristics behind their consistency.

Distinguishing Between the Rare 11 and the Top 50

Main Takeaway: The 11, with a heavy tilt to multistrategy funds, over the trailing 5 years through 2024, delivered superior returns with less risk than the 50. But over a much longer time, that distinction diminishes due to greater drawdowns.

1. Five-year net annualized returns of the 11 is 15.63%, two percentage points higher than the Top 50 and one percentage point more than the S&P 500. Credit this outperformance to 2022, when the 11 generated an average return of 15.5% while the 50 was up 9.1% and the market was down more than -18%.
2. With 3 of the 11 funds having been launched in the 1990s, this group’s average age is nearly 5 years older than the Top 50, which is already a very senior 16-plus years.
3. The older 11 has a much higher average drawdown since inception of -21.6% versus the 50’s -16.7%. These larger losses shrunk the difference in annualized returns since inception: 12.6% for the 11 and 11.8% for the 50.
4. Five of the 11 funds are multistrategy, a much higher percentage than the Top 50 (9 of 50); two credit strategies are in the 11, where 12 made the 50; and 2 of the 3 macro funds that made the 50 are in the 11.
5. With a higher tilt toward multistrategy funds, it’s no surprise the average fund size of the 11 is more than twice the average of the Top 50 and, even when knocking out the elephant on the list Citadel Wellington, the 11 is still nearly twice as large of the average 50 fund AUM.
6. Smaller funds are well represented with 6 of the 11 funds managing \$3.5 billion or less. Many of these funds had managed much fewer assets when the survey first started tracking them many years ago. This reveals the unique value of identifying talented, smaller, and often less-expensive managers earlier in their careers.

Characteristics Driving Consistency

After years of interviewing portfolio managers, this survey has found that consistent performance is rooted in an experienced management team that’s been working together on the same strategy for many years and is committed to a disciplined investment process. Specific management features include:

- Profit taking, limiting losses from cascading, and regular investment rotation.
- Limited or no exogenous leverage.
- Proven ability to distinguish between noise and opportunity.
- Target less researched and less crowded idiosyncratic investments with low market correlation.
- Limits downside by hedging core risks, and restricting concentration and investment correlation.
- Learns from failure and is willing to challenge beliefs that are no longer productive.
- Aligns investor interests by having material management fund exposure and being candid and transparent about operations, investments, and performance.
- Has attracted a stable long-term base of investors.

Jeffrey Growney, partner at the 21st-ranked **Millstreet Credit**, explains the fund “has steadily grown over the years because we’ve stuck to a disciplined process in targeting stressed and distressed credits where we believe the underlying value of targeted uncorrelated securities are unlikely to fall significantly below our entry prices and where we see conditions that enable credit performance to be sustained or enhanced.” And when the fund is wrong, it gets out sooner rather than later, limiting performance drag.

Its worst drawdown over the last 5 years was -4.4% with a standard deviation that wasn’t much higher and a Sharpe ratio of 2.4.

He also credits the management team that has been together since the fund’s launch in 2010 and follows a proven investment process, which avoids leverage and focuses on under-researched small- and mid-cap corporate debt or loans that are realized within 3 years or less.

The partner also thinks the fund’s sticky investor base reduces uncertainty about material redemption to enable credit investments to run their course. That reality was firmly established between 2018 and 2020 when endowments, foundations, and pensions, along with so-

phisticated family offices, became nearly 90% of the fund. Partner capital has held steady at 5% since the fund’s launch.

Millstreet has also avoided the performance trap often associated with funds that significantly expand past an originally stated capacity. The firm was originally targeted to close at \$2 billion before inflation and interest rates took off in 2022. Growney explains that increased stressed and distressed opportunities enabled the fund to grow assets further without compromising its investment strategy.

Last year, net returns remained in lockstep with the fund’s 12% historical annualized net returns.

This year, management will hard close the fund around \$4 billion—a nearly 10-fold increase over assets the fund was running at the end of 2018 when this survey originally identified this remarkably consistent manager.

nology enables the investment team to track and uncover opportunities derived from constant review of thousands of issuers and financial instruments.

All of this has attracted significant pension fund interest that’s more than 40% of assets, while internal capital is over 25%. Collectively, this commitment helps sustain support of a well-established investment process.

Hedged-equity fund Anson Investments has seen its ranking steadily increase from 27th- to this year’s 2nd-ranked fund because of its focus on idiosyncratic investments with limited market correlation that has generated even larger annualized monthly gains when the market is down (+1.32%) than when the market is rallying (+1.17%).

When Anson qualified for *The Wall Street Journal* Survey, it was managing \$354 million at the end of 2018. The Toronto-based fund has since grown to \$1.2 billion due to one of the industry’s highest winning

AN EXCLUSIVE CLUB

Fund	Strategy	Fund Assets (\$ Million) as of Dec. 2024	2024 Net Returns (Hurdle 6%)	5-Year Annualized Net Returns (%) thru 2024	Annualized Net Returns (%) since inception thru 2024	Worst Draw Down (%) Last 5 Yrs thru 2024	5-Year Annualized Standard Deviation thru 2024	5-Year Sharpe Ratio thru 2024	5-Year Fund Correlation versus S&P 500 TR thru 2024
Anson Investments Master (Toronto)	Equity Long / Short	1,212	10.01	24.09	15.12	-5.36	11.88	1.80	0.16
Citadel Wellington (Miami)	Multistrategy	52,330	15.21	23.66	19.46	NA	NA	NA	NA
DE Shaw Composite (New York)	Multistrategy	26,800	18.00	17.73	12.59	NA	3.61	4.22	0.10
Citadel Global Fixed Income (Miami)	Macro/Fixed Income	3,500	9.89	16.59	11.86	NA	NA	NA	NA
Millennium USA LP (New York)	Multistrategy/Credit Rel. Value	22,797	15.05	15.13	13.67	-0.64	3.52	3.58	0.07
Millstreet Credit (Boston)	Credit Long/Short	3,938	12.54	14.52	12.04	-4.39	4.91	2.44	0.47
Blue Diamond Non-Directional (Pfaffikon, Switz.)	Statistical Arbitrage	2,479	11.85	13.04	14.33	-4.95	7.95	1.32	0.44
Mudrick Distressed Opp. (New York)	Distressed Credit	2,000	32.01	12.17	11.33	-19.50	16.04	0.53	0.15
Wolverine Flagship Fund Trading Ltd (Chicago)	Multistrategy	4,807	12.48	10.13	8.14	-10.84	6.67	1.14	0.51
Citadel Global Fixed Income (Miami)	Macro/Fixed Income	3,500	9.89	16.59	11.86	NA	NA	NA	NA
Mariner Atlantic Multistrategy Ltd (New York) *	Fixed-Income Relative Value Multistrategy	2,918	6.76	8.29	7.65	-3.21	3.21	1.51	0.08
Rare 11		11,480	13.97	15.63	12.55	-6.98	7.22	2.07	0.25
BarclayHedge Hedge Fund Index		NA	9.68	6.15	7.73	-11.90	8.17	0.44	0.91
S&P 500 Total Return Index		NA	25.02	14.52	12.07	-23.89	18.06	0.66	1.00
JPMorgan Global Gov’t Bond Index		NA	0.15	-1.35	5.94	-17.13	5.03	-0.77	0.47

* Had Mariner Atlantic data been available for 2018, it would’ve made the short list in the 2019 survey.

Consistency has also been the hallmark of the \$4.8 billion **Wolverine Flagship Trading** fund, which has generated 23 years of stable returns. Over that time, the 38th-ranked fund had only three down years with cumulative losses of under 30%.

The Chicago-based fund credits a key source of consistency being an in-house management team that’s been together for more than 15 years. The firm believes this has led to candid debate and efficient collaboration.

Another key driver of steady returns is its uncorrelated sub-strategies, led by capital structure arbitrage, which benefit from the firm’s extensive network of market-maker and execution services. Proprietary tech-

records. It has lost money in only one year after more than 18 years in business. Reflecting the fund’s incongruous performance, that off year (-9.9%) occurred in 2017, when the market was up nearly 22%.

CEO Amin Nathoo credits the fund’s focus on smaller-cap and under-researched investments, its multi-manager approach that targets strategies uncorrelated to one other, and maintenance of low net exposure for consistent performance.

“We also believe,” explains Nathoo, “that having a core investment team that’s been working together for more than a decade supports open and productive dialogue.” And with management owning 26% of the fund, that also aligns its interest with those of its external investors. (See fund profile on pp. 28.)

by Genna Lozovsky, largely targets EM credit around the globe, ex-China. It targets shorter-term event driven credit opportunities, ranging from distressed Ukrainian corporate credits to the recovering Argentinian sovereigns. And it hedges many systemic risks: from interest rate and FX to commodities and equity-risk premia.

While it had an uncharacteristically strong 2024, soaring nearly 40% on the confluence of a series of positive events, Lozovsky’s approach produces a bit less volatility than FIM, with a trailing 5-year standard deviation of 14.1% and a worst drawdown of -20% This has produced a Sharpe ratio over 1.

The third-best performing emerging market fund in the survey, like FIM, also targets

a specific region. **Enko Africa Debt**, which was launched in 2016, gained the 18th spot when it first qualified in the 2022 survey, with its unique story [profiled](#) in that edition. Since then, Enko has generated surprisingly consistent returns, with 5-year trailing returns of 15.5%—virtually the same as its returns since inception. But it wasn’t always easy.

Soaring inflation and interest rates, war, and supply-chain disruptions created all sorts of problems for the fund in 2022. But it rallied and ended the year slightly in the black, helping Enko to retain its 18th spot in the 2023 survey.

A 16.4% gain in 2023 again earned Enko the 18th spot last year. And despite having its best-year ever in 2024, gaining more than 27%, its

ranking unexpectedly eased to the 19th spot in this year’s survey.

These returns were minimally correlated to the market, producing a 5-year market correlation of 0.27.

The challenging year of 2022 pushed the fund’s 5-year standard deviation of 13.7% well above its historical rate of 10.8%. Lower long-term volatility (coupled with lower risk-free rates prior to 2022) helped generate a historical Sharpe ratio of 1.23, significantly better than its 5-year Sharpe of 0.97.in the 2023 survey.

RISKS & OPPORTUNITES

A sharply rallying global stock market has a way of dispelling concerns that had sent it tumbling not so long ago.

The issue that fueled the turmoil—the president’s announcement of wide-ranging tariffs—is still very much unresolved. And the underlying conditions that exaggerated the selloff are still present.

These are led by highly valued markets that don’t align with slowing earnings growth estimates, tremendous concentration of US equities comprising global exposure, and an unconstrained US president constantly challenging economic, business, legislative, legal, and diplomatic norms that’s adding to uncertainty and risk.

A recent study, discussed below, found nearly half of institutional investors surveyed expect volatility over the coming year to be even greater than it was during the global financial crisis.

In the wake of the stock market rally, it’s easy to forget warnings recently issued by a key supporter of President Trump.

Citadel’s Ken Griffin put it plainly. “We’re moving too quickly, we’re moving too haphazardly, and we’re breaking a lot of glass in trying to solve some very real problems . . . With the policy volatility, you actually undermine the very goal you’re trying to achieve.”

These concerns are also applicable to domestic policies that are significantly affecting every facet of American life, from farmers and veterans, education and health care, to state and local finances and

ANSON INVESTMENTS

Truly Idiosyncratic Consistency



Moez Kassam CIO

Early on, before the manager attended college, it was evident that Anson CIO Moez Kassam would take a different approach to investing.

It was in the middle of the Internet craze of the late 1990s. Instead of tracking an intriguing new product or a shrewd business guru, Moez instead discovered newsletters that hyped the next Nokia were fairly good indicators of stocks worth shorting.

His former high school mate and future CEO Amin Nathoo recalled, “Moez initially fell victim to this kind of marketing, but he learned quickly.”

Fast-forward more than two decades and two Canadians found themselves running one of the most consistently-performing hedge funds this survey has ever tracked.

Far from a household name, the \$1.2 billion Toronto-based fund has qualified for this survey since the current ranking system was established for the version published by [The Wall Street Journal](#) in 2019 when it notched the 27th spot. Its ranking has risen every year since, now claiming 2nd place in this year’s survey with trailing 5-year net annualized re-

turns of more than 24%. And since its inception in July 2007, the fund has generated annualized returns of more than 15% with only one down year.

Consistency of this diversified hedged equity shop is evident by how well it has controlled risk. Standard deviation since inception has been 10.4, and its worst drawdown (including the financial crisis and COVID) was just -18.7%.

This has helped to produce an historic Sharpe ratio of 1.23 and a 5-year trailing market correlation of just 0.16.

But perhaps the most telling data is the fund’s performance during months the market has been down. Anson calculates that figure being +1.32%, which is superior to its monthly returns of +1.17% when the market has been up.

Investments

Fund performance reflects Anson’s diverse and often unorthodox investments that range from traditional activist longs and opportunistic shorts, to SPACs and structured financing into small-cap equity that Anson can then profitably sell soon after such deals close.

In mid-2024, Anson exited one of its most profitable idiosyncratic trades involving a SPAC that had teamed up with the Trump Organization.

In September 2021, Digital World Acquisition Corporation (DWAC), a SPAC, started trading on the Nasdaq. A month later, it announced plans to merge with Trump’s Media and Technology Group (owner of the Truth Social platform) as

an efficient way to bring the latter entity public.

Initially, more than a dozen investors were considering participating in this \$1 billion SPAC. But it faced a series of regulatory and legal issues that delayed SEC approval.

The first involved an unusual effort to pre-register shares of the IPO before it was approved. The SPAC subsequently fired its CEO in 2023 and then lost nearly half its financing.

The SEC then disqualified the auditor who had reviewed DWAC’s financials. Compounding these issues, Trump was facing dozens of civil and criminal charges, and his political fortunes were far from clear—issues that would affect the eventual value of the newly merged company.

All of this contributed to a much smaller \$50 million offering.


Anson, which had been tracking the saga, saw an unusual opportunity evolving that had potential for large returns that only required small capital risk—a non-refundable 10% deposit on a potential \$15 million investment, which would only be made if and when the SEC approved the deal.

In February 2024, that finally happened. Shares of the merged company began trading in March 2024. Then, after the shares became registered in June, Anson sold its position, realizing a 300%+ gain.

As Trump won back the White House in November 2024, the fund was focusing on a series of early-stage quantum computing micro- and small-cap stocks that had caught the interest of retail investors who were driving up their prices even without these firms showing any profits.

Kassam then approved a series of related trades. One of his submanagers shorted many of the high-flying, overvalued shares, while another submanager scoured for opportunities to extend financing to


Continued on p. 30



Source: FactSet Research Systems Inc. All data is in CAD as of Dec 31, 2024.

Tariffs, increased military spending, declining foreign assistance, and slowing growth will hurt emerging markets and likely shorten the time between EM market default cycles.

- Polina Kurdyavko
Head of BlueBay Emerging Markets



Source: European Central Ban

In just 6 months the Euro has rallied nearly 16% against the dollar, reflecting an accelerated decline in demand for dollar-based assets and in sentiment towards the Greenback.

financial markets oversight. Griffin said his biggest fear is the damage the president's approach and policies were doing to the country. "The United States is more than just a nation. It's a brand. It's a universal brand, whether it's our culture, our financial strength, our military strength ... It's like an aspiration for most the world. And we're eroding that brand right now." Four independent reports released in June serve as a

reality check. A leading association of US CEOs, Business Roundtable, found economic sentiment among America's top CEOs having plunged to the lowest level since 2020, with its employment indicator having fallen by almost 19 points, its capital expenditures indicator down 15 points, and sales expectations off 10%. The World Bank significantly cut its global growth forecasts for 2025 from 2.7% to

2.3% and warned that global growth for the decade is "on track for the weakest performance for any decade since the 1960s due to trade tensions, policy uncertainty, and financial stress." The head of hedge fund allocations at the World Bank Pension Fund, Mohamed Farid, who oversees \$3.5 billion, said he had no conviction about where the market or the economy are heading. The reason: "uncertainty and

volatility that will continue for the rest of the year and likely beyond, since it's a reflection of the manner in which the US president operates." The one thing that is clear to Farid: the market remains expensive and overinvested. Consistently elevated volatility was also the takeaway from a recent study by the \$1 billion UK asset management firm Schroders. The report found that nearly half of North American institutional investors surveyed expect volatility over the next year to be even greater than it was during the global financial crisis. Consumer sentiment, regularly tracked by the University of Michigan, rebounded in early June, but is still near secular lows, driven by fear of rising prices and a slowing economy. Survey director Joanne Hsu told Bloomberg, "When all the signals are pointing the same way, it's just really dangerous to overlook." The future safe-haven status of US dollar-denominated assets was also found to be in doubt by a vast majority of 47 economists polled recently by the Kent A. Clark Center for Global Markets at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business. Driving this concern: growing US debt, a new Fed chair in 2026 who will likely ease interest rates regardless of inflation, and the declining value of the dollar. An additional reality check:

Anson Investments continued from p. 28

others to gain access to discounted equity that soon after could be sold. Nathoo explains the fund has been actively providing such structured financing to small-cap companies for a while, and it has been a major driver of returns over the past five years. By the end of 2024, the post-election rally further drove these momentum stocks. While Anson profited from equity sales related to its financings, it lost more than that on the shorts. This sliced off 5% from the fund's full-year performance, leaving Anson up 10% in 2024. Likely due to the fund's unique and diverse strategies, institutional investors comprise less than 10% of Anson's investor base. CEO Nathoo says the vast majority of the fund's investors are high net-worth and family offices, and that 75 percent of LP assets have been with the firm for at least a decade, reflecting a deep-seated commitment to Anson. And the firm keeps GP and LP interests aligned with management owning 28% of the fund. The firm's commitment to process drives consistency. This starts with net exposure that's more like a market neutral fund, running between 0% and 35%. Currently it's around 20%. Second, the fund's multi-manager approach has each manager deploying a strategy that, to varying degrees, is lowly correlated to one other and the market. It adopted this structure as growing assets and focus on under-researched small-cap companies required more manpower. Starting in 2018, Anson began adding in-house, non-beta-focused managers. While each strategy's individual performance may be volatile, collectively they produce a low-volatility book. Third, the core management team has been together for more than a decade. According to Kassam, this familiarity supports open and robust debate and un-

derstanding, aligning focus and interest. It forges a more stable and reliable operation, and helps the team recognize and effectively respond to risk. 2025 and Beyond Many Canadian REITS are undervalued, according to Nathoo. With Anson being an experienced real estate investor, one in particular caught the firm's attention: InterRent, a \$1.9 billion market cap. The residential REIT, which trades on the TSX, had lost about 40% since the fall of 2021. Anson thought it could apply its evolving activist strategy to help unlock value. It became the REIT's largest shareholder at 9%. With the ability to reshape the board of directors, Anson encouraged InterRent to reduce and eliminate unproductive joint ventures and multi-insider agreements. It suggested simplification of the company's business structure and strategy to help improve decision-making. And Kassam thought the REIT could make more efficient use of excess profits to increase buybacks and dividends. One way to help realize these improvements was for management to take the firm private. Kassam thought a buy-in sale at a significant premium over the stock's December 2024 stock price would secure sufficient shareholder support for the deal. Growing investor awareness of pending changes started moving its stock higher. And in early 2025, the firm announced plans for an internal buyout. In late May, a bid was made at a 40% premium to the 52-week low. It's now in a 40-day go-shop period where potential external buyers can make an offer. As of mid-June, with Anson maintaining its

exposure, the stock was trading slightly above the deal price, suggesting some investors think another offer may be coming. * Looking ahead, Nathoo sees inflation remaining somewhat sticky, making it difficult for the Federal Reserve to lower interest rates despite a weakening economy. Accordingly, the fund believes this sets up the potential for stagflation, a risk that's not receiving the consideration it merits due to more urgent issues currently buffeting markets. The big one is tariffs. Kassam, like many fund managers, avoids even trying to predict what the US Administration will eventually do. "This clearly adds uncertainty," he explains, "to an already highly-priced market and a president who frequently changes his mind." A key to sustaining the fund's performance, says Kassam, is to "target investments in the US and Canada that are not directly affected by changing tariff policies." Still, he knows industries and markets are invariably linked regardless of tariff exposure. So, he sticks with a steady approach of, "being more responsive to conditions, rather than trying to be predictive in fashioning shorter duration opportunities."



Amin Nathoo CEO

The US has been the dominant investment story for years, with its weighting in global equity indices now exceeding 70%. That's a lot of weight.

The search for diversified exposure, hastened by the uncertainty triggered by Washington's flailing tariff policies, has started leading some investors to Europe.

One such opportunity is the 30th-ranked BlueBay Event Driven Credit vehicle, that's part of the firm's special situations strategy, which focuses on European mid-market corporates. The euro-denominated fund is lowly correlated to US and European equity markets. And over the past 5 years through 2024, it has generated annualized returns of 11.5%. That's 5 percentage points greater than the average event driven fund tracked by BarclayHedge.

PM Adam Phillips explains sluggish European recovery since the pandemic has fueled performance by providing plenty of stressed and distressed credit opportunities, especially within the sub-\$500 million market-cap space in which BlueBay hunts.

Because the strategy runs \$550 million, these small, under-researched companies are ideally sized for BlueBay, which typically limits exposure to no more than 20% of the firm's size. "We typically make investments of between \$10 and \$30 million in first-lien loans and bonds that are high up in the capital structure," says Phillips, "and these investments generally comprise 80% of our book."

Helm Change

The strategy had been around for nearly a decade when Phillips joined in late 2020—smack in the middle of the pandemic and what may have been viewed

as a very challenging time. The manager thought otherwise.

"We saw many overleveraged firms," says Phillips, "struggling in the aftermath of COVID and then shocked by soaring energy prices that were triggered by the Russian invasion of Ukraine." These firms were then hit by rising interest rates in response to the sudden surge in inflation, which reached double-digits in Europe.

He notes these smaller European firms are less resilient to economic events than their larger brethren, in part because they have less access to various sources of capital and are more reliant on banks. When these credits turn distressed, Phillips says banks are then inclined to sell such paper, which creates buying opportunities for funds that are well versed in managing such risks.

Being sector agnostic and able to identify firms that are likely able to manage through their debt issues (along with those that likely cannot), Phillips has delivered annualized gains of 11.5%—the strongest five-year run the strategy has ever experienced. And the strategy was up nearly 4% in the first quarter of 2025. This has helped surge assets from less than \$100 million to \$550 million.

Investing in challenging environments is part of Phillips' DNA. While working at a merchant bank in Asia in the late 1990s, he had a front-row seat to the evolving emerging market financial crisis that hit later in the decade. And not too many years later, he was working at Lehman Brothers in London when the Tech Wreck struck in 2000.

He then joined one of the biggest names in opportunistic investing, Marathon Asset Management, where, as European CIO, he built and ran continental oper-

BLUEBAY EVENT DRIVEN CREDIT

Profiting . . . Over There



Adam Phillips, PM, Event Driven Credit

ations for a decade.

After joining RBC BlueBay and becoming PM of the strategy, Phillips says he helped refine its investment process, expanding its research capacity and increasing focus on details that can help distinguish between average and more profitable investments. And success has forged a virtuous cycle as a growing asset base has supported a larger team and more extensive research.

Despite shocks of pandemic, war, inflation, and rising interest rates, a notable absence so far during Phillips' tenure has been down years.

In fact, the strategy has had only two negative years across its 15-plus years in business, which amounted to just -3.6% in losses. This limited downside, especially since 2020, is reflected in the strategy's mild annualized volatility of 8.7% and a Sharpe ratio of 1.2.

The manager points to six main attributes that have helped control losses: understanding a firm's capital structure and liabilities; identifying where a firm's decision-making authority actually lies; deciphering local bankruptcy laws; and accurately assessing valuation and liquidity

of underlying collateral.

Doing all this helps the firm, more often than not, establish entry prices that are close to the near-term lows. Further, Phillips has found it advantageous to be on ad hoc bond holder or bank steering committees to influence and effect a desirable outcome.

This approach has helped produce a success rate of 75%. The fund has 12 fully realized investments since 2020 that have produced fund gains of more than 1% versus one trade that had resulted in a fund loss of more than -1%.

That trade, which lost the fund -1.4%, involved a large-cap US firm in 2022. First-lien lenders, which included BlueBay, were hurt by "a liability management exercise" that turned investments south.

Investments

RBC BlueBay's leveraged finance team was already invested in Demire Deutsche Mittelstand Real Estate AG when Phillips' team took note of a potential opportunity shaping up with a €499 million maturing bond issue.

Like many commercial German proper-

ty firms, Demire was struggling in 2023 with the combination of rising interest rates and a challenging selling environment that limited its ability to reduce and repay debt.

Demire was unlikely to secure new financing. Phillips saw the firm's attractive loan-to-value ratio of 53%, Apollo Global Management holding a majority equity position, and existing BlueBay's knowledge and involvement through its leveraged finance team as encouraging reasons to believe a restructuring or an amend and extend agreement was likely.

In August 2023, Phillips' team established a position in the 2024 bonds at 65.

The company, creditors, and Apollo began restructuring negotiations in late 2023 in which RBC BlueBay was a key member of the ad hoc group. The group supported a plan under which Apollo would inject an additional €100 million of capital that enabled both a reduction in debt and an extension of the bond's maturity by three years.

This deal, which was completed in October 2024, enabled Demire to tender €209 million of the bonds at 81.25 and repurchase €49.5 million worth of bonds at par that generated an overall creditor exit price of 83.13. Phillips' earned an IRR of 33%.

Around the same time the strategy was digging into Demire, BlueBay was also looking at a stressed British specialist care provider, Voyage Care, that offers services both in-home and at its own residential facilities. It has hundreds of locations and freehold properties whose collective value of £312 million exceeded the firm's £271 million in debt.

The combination of Brexit and COVID resulted in staff loss. This forced manage-

ment to boost wages to attract qualified personnel and resulted in a decline of EBITDA from around £45-50 million to £35 million. This sent bond prices falling.

Believing diminished earnings were only temporary, the investment team established a position at 72 in November 2023.

By the second half of 2024, Voyage Care received its fee increase from the UK National Health Services, which helped boost revenue by 10% that year. EBITDA then rebounded to over £40m with expectations of further growth. By the end of the year, the team sold the investment at 96.

Looking Ahead

Phillips sees President Trump's tariff policies driving risk and opportunity in Europe in unexpected ways. "Production and sales of mid-market European companies are to a significant extent contained within the continent, ostensibly insulated from the tariff wars," posits Phillips. But European markets are not, with debt and equity prices trading often in lockstep with US securities regardless of underlying corporate fundamentals.

Volatility has delayed some pending IPOs and mergers on which some of BlueBay's investments were geared.

Still, Phillips is generally optimistic, not just because of opportunities caused by tariff disruption. "Europe may benefit," he explains, "as the chaos forces the continent to seek greater unification in policies and to think more independently."

More spending on guns than on butter will happen. But the upside, Phillips thinks, is that, "Europeans may feel more in control of their destiny than they have been for quite some time."

In last year’s feature interview conducted in May 2024, Eurasia CEO Maziar Minovi served up a series of predictions that turned out to be spot on. They included a Trump victory and markets underestimating the geopolitical impacts of his return to power. Minovi anticipated increasing conflict with Iran that would escalate beyond the previous tit-for-tat, potentially impacting oil. He saw an increasingly entrenched stalemate between Russia and Ukraine as US support erodes. And he anticipated the Fed would sustain higher interest rates for longer.

Below are the leading geopolitical risks Eurasia Group cited heading into 2025. So far, they also seem to be spot on.

We’re entering a uniquely dangerous period of world history on par with the 1930s and

the early Cold War. Specifically: The US and China will export disruption to everyone else this year, short-circuiting the global economic recovery and accelerating geo-economic fragmentation. And as most governments opt for lighter-touch regulation and as international cooperation falters, AI capabilities and risks will continue to grow unchecked.

TRUMP: The erosion of independent checks on executive power and the rule of law will increase the extent to which the US policy landscape depends on the decisions of one powerful man. Further, Donald Trump is about to inherit a robust US economy, but his policies will undermine its strength this year through higher inflation and reduced growth.

Eurasia Group’s Key Geopolitical Risks



EUROPE: Economic malaise, security threats, and defense shortcomings meant Europe was always going to face a daunting 2025. Donald Trump’s return to power will exacerbate these geopolitical and economic pressures, threatening the con-

tinents with an existential crisis that could break European unity.

This year will test the maxim that when faced with a crisis, the EU always pulls together. But just like during the Eurozone crisis, Brexit, the pandemic, and Russia’s

2022 invasion of Ukraine, the EU will likely overcome—or, at a minimum, muddle through—these challenges, too.

IRAN: The Middle East will remain a combustible environment in 2025, for one big reason: Iran hasn’t been this weak in decades. Simply put, Iran is a sitting duck.

US-CHINA: Trump’s return to office will unleash an unmanaged decoupling in the world’s most important geopolitical relationship.

RUSSIA: Russia will do more than any other country to subvert the global order in 2025.

Russia is the world’s leading rogue power, now by a large margin following the collapse of Iran’s ability to project power. This

year, Moscow will pursue more policies that undermine the US-led global order, despite a likely ceasefire in Ukraine. Russia will take hostile, asymmetric steps against EU countries—particularly those on the front lines—as they continue to support anti-Russian policies. It will also continue its role as leader of the Axis of Rogues—the strategic military partnership with Iran and North Korea that could significantly disrupt global stability this year.

Putin’s revisionist goals toward the US-led West are a core driver of his foreign policy. The Russian president strongly objects to NATO expansion and Russia’s exclusion from the European security system. These grievances lie behind Putin’s desire to undermine Western democracies and provoke chaos in the US-led Western alliance system.

the Magnificent 7 is primarily driving US equity performance. According to Howard Silverblatt, senior index analysts at S&P Dow Jones Indices, the average equity move since the nadir hit in early April through late June is a little over 3% versus near-

ly 32% for the Magnificent 7. MEMCO’s head of investments, Justin Young, is concerned about excessive retail and traditional long-only investors remaining at near-peak historical allocations despite growing economic pessimism in survey data.”

That data, partially echoed in the studies cited above, includes slowing growth, rising unemployment and US government debt, stubborn inflation that will increase with tariffs and a falling dollar, sinking US new home sales and low existing home sales, and the sharp exodus out of long-term US bond funds that may portend higher long-term rates on which so much core lending is based.

The fear of extended maturities, explains fixed-income portfolio manager Bill Campbell at DoubleLine, “is a symptom of a much bigger problem. There is a lot of concern domestically and from the foreign investor community about owning the long end of

the Treasury curve.” Patrick Ghali, partner at the London-based global consultancy Sussex Partners, says that “signs beneath the surface of the market rebound suggest not all is as it seems.” He thinks the current rally is simply about liquidity and momentum chasing returns globally.

Kristina Hooper, Man Group’s chief market strategist, puts it more bluntly, believing markets’ buoyancy is “incomprehensible” and is more likely to end in disappointment.


Looking ahead, a partner at the \$13 billion Swiss-based investment firm NS Partners, Cédric Dingens, believes US leadership is one of the most significant risks.

“We have the impression,” observes Dingens, “there’s a serious disconnect between what the current US administration sees as reality and what reality actually is. This reflects more than the president’s thinking about economics and markets. There appears to be no serious assessment about problems and solutions—a lack of robust methodology that’s driving his policies.”

While many domestic allocators and managers share Dingens’ thinking, they fear speaking candidly. I’ve seen, first-hand, industry leaders admit a need to edit their remarks. A British expatriate partner of a Top 50 hedge fund running his firm’s US

“(Our) poll found that more than 90 per cent of 47 economists surveyed were either somewhat concerned or very concerned about the safe-haven role of US dollar-denominated assets over the next five to ten years.”

- Kent A. Clark Center for Global Markets
University of Chicago Booth School of Business



office has developed contingency plans in case members of his team have their work visas revoked.

In this kind of environment, Dingens finds it hard to assess risk and said his firm has heightened its focus on capital preservation. Yet, it also

seeks to exploit opportunities caused by policy-induced dislocation.

NS Partners’ current hedge fund exposure is led by equity long/short, that’s been benefiting from higher dispersion. The most noteworthy performance has been generated

by the firm’s macro managers that have shorted the US dollar, played the yield curve, and was long gold and specific emerging markets.

With the continent finally rallying, Sussex Partners is adding small European equity managers running low-net

BLUEBAY EMERGING MARKET CREDIT ALPHA

Distinguishing Inefficiency From Risk

Head of BlueBay’s Emerging Market Debt and PM of its EM Credit Alpha Strategy, Polina Kurdyavko has figured out how to take much of the risk out of emerging market investing to generate consistently profitable returns.

Since its launch in late 2011, this 27th-ranked strategy has generated net annualized returns of more than 9% and a worst draw-down of -16.2%, while suffering just one



Polina Kurdyavko PM

down year when performance was off -6.6%. A good part of Kurdyavko’s understanding of emerging markets comes not only from her aptitude but from her personal familiarity with such economies.

Born of Armenian and Ukrainian parents and having spent her early years in Moscow, Kurdyavko’s roots are very much in emerging markets. The challenges of growing up in the Russian capital toward the end of the last century made her exceedingly curious about how things worked and didn’t work in places like Russia.

Three times her family had lost their wealth—first due to the war in Afghanistan in 1988, then when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, and then again in 1998

when the emerging market crisis spread across the globe.

“I wanted to learn why these financial crises kept reoccurring,” recalls Kurdyavko, “and in doing so, hopefully prevent my family from ever suffering that same fate again.”

After working for Alliance Bernstein and UBS as an EM equity and credit analyst, she then joined BlueBay in London. In 2007, she was managing the emerging market credit sleeve of the firm’s

multistrategy investment vehicle.

Having generated nearly triple-digit returns during the first 4½ years of operations, which included the Great Recession, Kurdyavko was given the reigns to manage a standalone EM strategy.

A Different Perspective

While much of the investment world looks at EM as risky, Kurdyavko sees it instead as inefficient. That subtle distinction, explains the manager, is key to distinguishing significant upside opportunities from investments that are likely to stumble. Making that determination, Kurdyavko says, requires in-depth research and nuanced understanding of local markets. It also involves portfolio and trade construction that is often more complex than what’s demanded in many developed market deals.

Performance is also driven by geopolitical and macro events that are often more pronounced in emerging than developed markets. One recent example: the Russian invasion of Ukraine during which sanctions, soaring energy prices, supply chain prob-

lems, inflation, and rising interest rates led to increased stress and volatility across global markets but directly impacted corporate and sovereign debt in Russia and Ukraine.

Understanding how to manage this volatility fueled the strategy’s strong 5-year run.

Over that time through 2024, the strategy generated annualized returns of 12.4%. That was nearly three times the return of the average EM hedge fund tracked by Barclay-Hedge.

While the S&P 500 delivered 2.1 percentage points greater returns than the strategy over this time, it did so with 50% more volatility. That suggests the strategy’s risk-return profile has been more attractive than the US market.

The team controls the downside through effective hedging techniques as well as strict stop-loss policies on both individual positions and at the strategy level.

This is triggered when a single credit loses more than -250 bps. For the overall strategy, it starts at -3.5% decline. A harder trigger kicks in at -7%.

Before key investments are made, Kurdyavko requires the preparation of worst-case scenarios or “pre-mortems,” as her team calls them. After studying sovereign or corporate risks, local and nationwide events that lie ahead, and regional geopolitical uncertainties, various scenarios are then devised that stress-test positions. “This analysis also helps us determine the most viable hedges,” explains Kurdyavko.

Assets & Growth

Despite the compelling track record of this strategy, increasing regulatory restrictions on pension investments, along with Brexit,

has limited the team’s ability to market the strategy and grow assets. The managers are mindful, however, that a smaller asset base helps keep the strategy nimble.

The strategy’s \$540 million book combined with strong bottom-up fundamental study has allowed the manager to effectively exploit smaller, less-researched corporate opportunities involving tickets ranging from \$20 to \$50 million. Examples include provision of first-lien post-bankruptcy financing and borrowing bonds to short smaller issuances, both of which would likely be off-radar for larger funds.

The investment team also invests in much larger issuers, such as Argentina, where the strategy has made money over five of the last six years.

National elections in Argentina have been driving opportunities as incumbents perennially struggle balancing the country’s poor finances, promises of reform, and desire to sustain populist support through unaffordable spending.

In 2019, then-President Macri’s failure to deliver reforms fueled greater debt and economic uncertainty that contributed to a weakening currency.

The increasing likelihood that the opposing Perónist ticket (Alberto Fernández and Cristina Kirschner) might win and stymie reforms led Kurdyavko and her co-PM, Anthony Kettle, to establish a pair trade: going long highly discounted 100-year dollar bonds and effectively shorting government debt by buying fairly inexpensive default protection via CDS.

Macri lost the October election, the market railed, and bonds defaulted in June. In this case, the price of the already discounted 100-year bond dropped significantly less than other bonds in the curve. However, the default itself triggered the CDS which, in turn, helped the strategy generate a net gain of 10%.

Kurdyavko and Kettle instituted a similar trade at the end of September 2023 during the lead-up to the November 2023 elections, but with conditions far more severe: triple-digit inflation, a plummeting peso, and a deep recession.

Argentinian assets had previously sold off, and restructured dollar bonds due in 2038 and 2041 were trading around \$0.20 when the managers bought them sporting a current yield of 23%. The strategy countered the position with CDS.

This time, the PMs were slightly more optimistic that reforms would happen regardless of who won because conditions were so dire.

Milei’s surprise victory over Fernández sent the price of the bonds soaring. By the time BlueBay closed the position a year later at the end of 2024, the trade was responsible for one-third of the strategy’s 2024 returns, or about 7%.

Managing A Sideways Play

In late 2021, BlueBay established a long position in a hard currency 2030 Ghanian sovereign backed by the World Bank at 115. That position turned more challenging, however, when a *Financial Times* opinion piece questioned that partial guarantee. Its value stumbled back to par. The rarity of the issue limited the size of the investor base, research, and subsequent demand for the security.

Kurdyavko and Kettle then established a series of short positions involving non-guaranteed sovereigns due between 2025 and 2029, which were trading at significant discounts.

Around this time, the country was confronted with slowing growth, a falling currency, and surging public debt as global inflation and interest rates soared on the back of supply shocks related to the Russian invasion of Ukraine and post-COVID economics. This made it more challenging for Ghana to re-finance and turned sovereign prices more

volatile.

Having closely scrutinized the bond’s documents, the manager was also aware that its structure was part of broader World Bank program serving a number of countries and concluded the guarantee would hold. The team traded around the long 2030 exposure as the bond sold off. This ended up reducing the strategy’s losses, which were then entirely offset by various shorts. By 2024, BlueBay had salvaged a 1% net profit.

What May Lie Ahead

Looking at the potential impacts of the US administration’s tariff and foreign policies, Kurdyavko thinks declining foreign assistance to many emerging markets may end up reducing liquidity and exacerbating pricing pressures on certain assets, resulting in potential price dislocations. When EM dislocations reflect technical flows and market mispricing rather than fundamentals, they may indicate opportunities.

Kurdyavko believes a weakening US dollar and strengthening EM currencies may lead to lower local interest rates. This may then fuel further rotation into local EM assets and in turn shape more discernable trends for her team to identify.

But she also fears current policy changes could shorten the period between emerging market default cycles caused by both slowing economic growth and greater military spending. The latter may lead to steeper yield curves and potentially higher refinancing costs for both developed and EM nations.

Kurdyavko thinks greater disruption, dispersion, and inflation will likely create opportunities in Central and South America and Sub-Saharan Africa.

As for the elephant in the room, Kurdyavko believes rationality will eventually prevail in Washington. But before it does, she fears, “substantial damage will be done as volatility and costs rise.”

and diversified exposure that targets low-beta idiosyncratic investments.

With the consultancy focused mainly on hedge funds, Ghali says Sussex avoids pure momentum and extensively hedged managers, searching instead for funds that can deliver gains from opportunistic longs and shorts. He admits, however, that the latter is periodically nicked by retail euphoria that triggers indiscriminate buying of “junk companies” and exposes its managers to short squeezes.

On the European stressed and distressed credit side, BlueBay’s head of special

situations, Adam Phillips, remains positive, not just because tariff disruption creates opportunities, which he suspects will remain extant for some time to come. “Europe may benefit,” he explains, “as the chaos forces the continent to seek greater unification in policies and to think more independently, allowing Europeans to feel more in control of their destiny than they have been for quite some time.”

What worries Moez Kassam, CIO of the 2nd-ranked Anson Investments, is stagflation. Given more immediate issues pressing investors at this moment, Kassam believes,

“markets are ignoring this risk that may be building as inflation remains sticky and the Fed is unable to ease interest rates.”

Like many fund managers, Kassam avoids even trying to predict what the US Administration will eventually do about tariffs. “This clearly adds uncertainty,” he explains, “to an already highly priced market and a president who frequently changes his mind.”

His strategy targets mostly North American investments that are not directly affected by changing tariff policies. (See examples in Kassam’s profile on p. 28.) Knowing that

security prices are still invariably correlated regardless of tariff exposure, Kassam believes it’s most productive to “respond to conditions rather than trying to predict them in fashioning shorter duration opportunities.”

Delivering the survey’s best returns last year, Sandglass Capital’s veteran EM manager Genna Lozovsky sees, “the combination of tariff uncertainty and excessive deficits likely amplifying US cyclical and structural risks.” He’s mindful of the adage that when the US snuffles, the rest of the world catches cold.

But Lozovsky, who’s profiled on p. 5, feels “continued dispersion and volatility coupled with the likelihood of lower interest rates and a weaker dollar should fuel EM growth and the prospects of finding more attractive opportunities.”

With the passage of the government’s budget, the country’s fiscal outlook will worsen. This structural challenge is what Justin Young worries most about, fearing that “meaningful reform is only likely when bond-market stress forces policymakers’ hands. Until then, various converging headwinds create an increasingly fragile backdrop for risk assets.” ■

Why Some Good Funds Didn’t Make the Survey

The reason why most hedge funds don’t qualify for this survey is because they are inconsistent.

But there are a number of really good managers that don’t qualify because they don’t meet all the thresholds for inclusion.

Five funds had regularly made this survey, but didn’t this year because of subpar 2024 performance. That doesn’t mean investors should lose faith in any of them, such as Starboard Value, Kryger Event, or EDL Global Opportunities. But in relying on objective parameters from which this survey won’t deviate, readers are provided with a list of the most consistently performing managers.

Until 2025, **Waha MENA Equity** has qualified for this survey every year since 2019.

Launched in January 2014, the fund’s trailing annualized returns through 2024 have been 15.3%, significantly outpacing the S&P Pan Arab Composite Index by 9.8% annually. Its annualized standard deviation of 10.5% and historic Sharpe ratio of 1.3 has helped boost assets of the Abu Dhabi-based fund to nearly \$1 billion.

But manager Mohamed El Jamal, who had soft-closed the fund last year had a modest 2024, up just 1.2%—well below the survey’s 2024 hurdle rate of 6%. This flat performance has continued through May 2025.

The main reason behind this shift in fortune, according to the fund, is that since October 7th, 2023, it has anticipated rising regional risk as fighting broke out in multiple directions. In response, El Jamal significantly reduced net exposure. Some positions he then underweighted and shorted moved against him.

This caution left Waha uncharacteristically out of sync with markets in 2024, which continued to rally. Still, the PM remains defensively positioned with the sudden outbreak of war between Iran and Israel.

A reason why this proven manager may regain his luster is because he believes the foundation of solid equity investing is rooted in sound credit analysis. El Jamal’s 37th-ranked EM Credit fund, which was launched two years before MENA equity, continues to thrive.

Later this year, the firm is adding two seasoned investment professionals to enhance the fund’s stock picking, further complementing Waha MENA’s experienced team and long track record of delivering compelling, consistent returns in one of the world’s fastest-growing regions.

BlackRock Strategic Equity is the firm’s flagship hedge fund and one of the most proficient funds not in the Top 50.


Launched in December 2011, the \$11.7 billion fund has generated annualized returns of more than 14%. Its annualized volatility is under 10% and, despite the high risks associated with equity investing, the fund’s worst drawdown is a modest -14.1%.

The London-based fund managed by Alister Hibbert has periodically suffered down years. First in 2016, when it lost -11.4%, then again in 2018 when it stumbled toward the end of the year which turned a decent performance into a slight loss of -0.13%.

But it was the challenging year of 2022 that prevented the fund from making the Top 50 when it lost more than -12%, suggesting significant market correlation.

Also based in London is Jack Lund’s **Axebrook Credit Alpha**. Managing a wee bit less than BlackRock, Lund’s \$413 million fund has been delivering 12.5% annualized returns with exceptionally low volatility of under 6% with a worst drawdown of just -1.25%, which hints at the fund holding assets that don’t trade much.

It failed to make the cut because it was launched in July 2020, just missing the 5-year performance requirement. Maybe next year.



This independent study is not a recommendation to invest in any of the funds profiled, ranked, or mentioned in the survey. The author is not responsible for any inaccuracies related to cited data or attributions. Readers that invest in any hedge fund must conduct their own extensive due diligence before allocating. Special thanks to Marina D’Angiolillo, research and professional services manager at Backstop BarclayHedge, for her extraordinary help for initially screening through thousands of funds in the firm’s database and performing specific fund analysis. And many thanks to my designer extraordinaire Coco Sallée.

All rights of this survey belong to Eric Uhlfelder and a licensing agreement must be secured with Mr. Uhlfelder for its commercial use. **Eric Uhlfelder** has covered global capital markets from New York for over 30 years for various major publications, including *The Financial Times*, *The Wall Street Journal*, *Institutional Investor*, *Pensions & Investments*, *The New York Times*, *The International Herald Tribune*, and *BusinessWeek*. He wrote the first book on the advent of the euro post currency unification, “Investing in The New Europe,” for Bloomberg Press. And he has earned a National Press Club Award. His website is www.globalinvestmentreport.net